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Copyright and the First Amendment:
Comrades, Combatants, or Uneasy Allies?
Joseph P. Bauer*
Abstract
The copyright regime and the First Amendment seek to promote the
same goals. Both seek the creation and dissemination of more, better, and
more diverse literary, pictorial, musical and other works. But, they use
significantly different means to achieve those goals. The copyright laws
afford to the creator of a work the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute,
transform, and perform that work for an extended period of time. The First
Amendment, on the other hand, proclaims that Congress "shall make no
law... abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, " thus at least
nominally indicating that limitations on the reproduction and distribution
of works-including the works of others-are forbidden.
Courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court in Eldred v. Ashicroft, have
stated that these two regimes can be reconciled in large part by some
mechanisms internal to the copyright system, and in particular the fair use
doctrine and the denial of copyright protection to facts and ideas. Yet, the
rejection of these two defenses in a number of prominent copyright
infringement actions, and the resulting unavailability of unconstrained
access to important materials, illustrates that, on occasion, broader
application of First Amendment protection is necessary.
This Article first explores the history, goals, and values of these two
regimes. It concludes that not only has First Amendment protection been
denied in important cases, but this denial has likely had a chilling effect in
many other instances, in which socially valuable uses of copyrighted
materials have been voluntarily forsaken for fear of litigation. The Article
then offers a test for greater unconstrained access to otherwise protected
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works. First Amendment interests should prevail: when there is a strong
public interest in allowing the unauthorized use of protectable expression;
when the speaker has a compelling need to use the expression itself, i.e.,
when paraphrasing, describing, or summarizing the work is inadequate to
meet the speaker's needs; and when there is no reasonable alternative
available to obtain consent to that use.
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L. Introduction
The apparent conflict is obvious. The Copyright Clause in the
Constitution provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power .. . To promote
the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors. ... the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings."' However, the First
Amendment famously provides that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.",2 Because the copyright
laws permit the copyright owner to enjoin others from speaking or writing,3
or copying and distributing, certain words, music, photographs, audio-
visual works and so forth, and to obtain monetary relief for such
unauthorized acts, has Congress not done precisely what the First
Amendment seems to preclude-enacted legislation which limits the speech
or writing of persons other than the copyright owner?
4
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8 (emphasis added).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
3. Here, I am using the terms "speaking" and "writing" in the broadest sense, to
include copying, distributing, performing and displaying a work-the exclusive rights given
to the owner of copyright by 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) & (3)-(5), subject, of course, to a variety of
limitations. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) also gives the copyright owner the exclusive right to make,
or to authorize others to make, "derivative works" from the underlying work. As discussed
below, the scope of this right also raises serious First Amendment issues.
4. It is true that the immediate and direct cause of any abridgement of speech or
writing almost always involves conduct taken at the behest of a private actor who seeks
injunctive or monetary relief against alleged infringers. However, both the source of those
rights and the authority for those lawsuits to enforce those rights is federal legislation. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 102-22 & 501-05 (2006) (setting out the contours of federal copyright
protections). In turn, the Copyright Office of the Library of Congress affords mechanisms
for the registration of copyrights. Id §§ 408-12. Also, the federal courts have power to
enter and then enforce judgments finding an infringement. Id § 411. Finally, the in
terrorem effect of the range of protections afforded to the copyright owner will often cause
others to desist from using those works without the need to resort to private litigation.
In recognition of the fact that harm from limitations on speech can be as severe and
problematic when the cause for the restraint is a private person or entity, it is clear that the
First Amendment not only operates as a limitation on the government's restriction on
speech, but also on many attempts by private parties to restrict the speech of other private
parties. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (noting that
"the text of the First Amendment..,. by its terms applies only to governmental action," but
concluding that similar concerns and standards apply to suit by private party); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264 (1964) (applying the First Amendment to a private
defamation action). But see Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 411,
422 (D.N.J. 2005) (refusing to allow the defendant to argue that a copyright owner's
enforcement actions had a "chilling effect" on its First Amendment rights, because "the First
Amendment is generally a protection of free speech against intrusion by the government, not
as among and between private parties").
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Some have suggested that this conflict is more apparent than real. 1
will argue that at least in certain respects, this conflict is all-too-real,5 and
that the very threat of a possible copyright infringement action may
impermissibly deter free speech. The conflict may be resolved in a number
of ways. At one end of the spectrum, one could take the view that the
copyright laws are unconstitutional. Even most free speech 
6 maximalists7
do not take that position.' At the other end, one could say that the copyright
5. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2d Cir. 2001)
(noting that "the fuindamental choice between impairing some communication and tolerating
[conduct which affects copyright interests] cannot be entirely avoided").
6. Professor Raker has argued that the freedom of speech and freedom of the press
clauses protect different interests, and therefore have different implications for the interface
of the copyright laws and the First Amendment. C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits
on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REv. 891, 897-99 (2002). In part, his distinction is premised on
a traditional version of speech-done by individuals-and of the press-typically
undertaken by corporate entities, and usually requiring significant sums of money to publish
and distribute works. Even accepting that those differences may at one time have been
meaningful-and in fact that was not the nature of the press in 1791-they have
considerably less vitality today, where the proliferation of "blogs" and Facebook pages
demonstrates that anybody with a computer and access to the Internet can be a "publisher,"
and where a significant component of "speech" occurs on broadcast media controlled by
multi-billion dollar entities.
Therefore, I use "freedom of speech" to include "freedom of the press." References to
"free speech" should be understood to encompass the full range of interests in unfettered
expression encompassed by the First Amendment-not only a "free press," but also the right
"peacefully to assemble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
7. The paradigm of a free speech maximalist was Justice Hugo Black. For example,
he wrote:
I read "no law .. , abridging" to mean no law abridging. The First Amendment,
which is the supreme law of the land, has thus fixed its own value on freedom of
speech and press by putting these freedoms wholly "beyond the reach" of
federal power to abridge. No other provision of the Constitution purports to
dilute the scope of these unequivocal commands of the First Amendment.
Consequently, I do not believe that any federal agencies, including Congress and
this Court, have power or authority to subordinate speech and press to what they
think are "more important interests."
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 158-59 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
8. But see DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTIST FIRST AMENDMENT 305-06 (2009):
[The [First] [Almendment would be better understood were it to be interpreted
at large as a straightforward constraint against the exercise of Congressional (or
state) power abridging speech and press .... When exclusivity interests in
expression are conferred for no better reason than the exclusivity will encourage
the production of such interests, or make them valuable in the hands of a favored
few, the First Amendment will then intervene. Congress may not thus forbid
our common participation in the universe of discourse.
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laws are entitled to special treatment, and that the First Amendment has no
role to play in determining the nature and scope of copyright protection.9
While few would go that far, many veer towards that end of the spectrum,
arguing that the First Amendment imposes only minimal restrictions on the
rights conferred by the copyright laws.'0
The claim that the First Amendment should have no, or at best only a
small, role to play with respect to copyright is particularly curious when
contrasted with the courts' treatment of other branches of intellectual
property or other forms of intangible property. For example, in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan," the Supreme Court held that in light of the First
Amendment, a claim for defamation could be asserted only if the plaintiff
proved "'actual malice'-that is, [if the statement was made] with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not."1 In a broad range of other cases, courts have unequivocally
held that claims under both state and federal law are all subject to First
Amendment constraints. 13 It is far from obvious why copyright should be
singled out for different analysis and harsher treatment.
9. See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[Clopyrights are
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment."), questioned on this
point, affid on other grounds, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003); see infra notes
159-74 and accompanying text (discussing Eldred v. Ashcroft).
10. The watershed scholarly contribution by advocates of a very limited role for the
First Amendment was an article by Professor Melville Nimmer. See Melville B. Nimmer,
Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. REv. 1180, 1196-1200 (1970) (acknowledging that there were a handful of
situations in which copyright interests would have to yield to free speech considerations and
envisioning exceptions where there is wedding of expression and ideas).
11. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 3 76 U.S. 254, 292 (1964) (finding that the freedoms
of speech and press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments applied in a libel
action brought by a public official).
12. Id. at 279-80.
13. An important accommodation of First Amendment interests to a federal legal
regime is the Noerr-Pennington doctrine under the antitrust laws. This judicially recognized
exception categorically immunizes a variety of petitioning activities-including attempts to
secure favorable legislation and prayers for judicial or administrative agency relief, even if
those activities result in injury to competition-from antitrust liability unless the defendant's
conduct was a "sham"; unless the defendant acted in bad faith and was not genuinely seeking
governmental action, but was using the petitioning process itself to injure competition. See
generally 10 EARL W. KiNTNER & JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW ch. 77
(1994).
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (finding that a radio broadcast
of intercepted telephone conversations about a matter of public concern was protected by the
First Amendment, even though a third party source for the radio commentator had violated
federal and state wiretap laws); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (finding that a
state statute, making it a crime to remain on another's property after being warned to leave,
835
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To provide context for this discussion, let me provide a brief summary
of the kinds of situations in which these conflicts have arisen. They fall
into two broad categories. In the first, plaintiffs have asserted "facial"
challenges to statutes expanding the scope of copyright protection, and they
have argued, in part, that the expansion was inconsistent with the First
Amendment. Examples of these situations have been challenges to the
constitutionality of the additional twenty-year term conferred by the
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA), 14 to the automatic renewal
provisions in the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992 (CRA),'5 and to the
restoration of copyright protection for certain works which had fallen into
the public domain by the Uruguay Round Agreement Act (TJRAA)l 6
The second category consists of a variety of "as applied" challenges.
Here, the defendant may have had a First Amendment defense to claims of
copyright infringement. While in many of these cases the court found for
the defendant, typically after concluding that the fair use defense shielded
the unauthorized use, in other cases the court found copyright infringement
and dismissed the defendant's First Amendment defenses.'17  Among the
situations falling into this second category were instances in which the
plaintiffs work was unique, and where adequate communication of the
speaker's views required reproduction or distribution of the copyrighted
abridged the First Amendment rights of a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses who was
attempting to distribute religious literature on a street in a company town); Matthews v.
Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the First Amendment bars
misappropriation and invasion of privacy claims that challenged a novel that truthfully
depicted the plaintiff, a public figure); infra notes 406-11 and accompanying text
(discussing C.B.C Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505
F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007), in which the court found that the First Amendment rights of a
company running a fantasy baseball league superseded the players' state right of publicity
claims).
14. See Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b) & (d), 112 Stat.
2827, 2827-28 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (extending
the duration of copyright protection); infra notes 158-74 and accompanying text (discussing
these challenges).
15. See Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, Title 1, § 102(a) & (d),
106 Stat. 264, 264-66 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)
(regulating a second term of copyright protection); infra notes 180-87 and accompanying
text (discussing these challenges).
16. See Uruguay Round Agreement Act, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006) (restoring copyright
protection to certain works which had fallen into the public domain); infra notes 188-208
and accompanying text (discussing these challenges).
17. See infra notes 311-18 and accompanying text (discussing Los Angeles News
Service v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.).
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expression; 18the creation of parodies or satires of famous works;' 9
reproduction of certain unpublished works, which the copyright owner
sought to shield completely from public examination; 20 and reproduction of
out-of-print works which had not yet fallen into the public domain.2
The theme of this Article is not only that the First Amendment should
play a significant role in demarcating copyright protection, but that the
courts and numerous commentators have understated its significance. Now
for the hard part: Just what should be the balance? And is there a
meaningful test or standard that can be articulated to reconcile the interests
embodied by these two regimes that give rise to the occasional real
conflicts?
This Article will proceed in four parts. First, I will examine whether
the history of these two provisions provides any guidance. Next, I will
identify and describe the goals of the copyright regime and of the First
Amendment. Third, I will examine the extent to which these goals may be
inconsistent, and how they may be harmonized. These attempts at
harmonization include various mechanisms internal to the copyright
regime, which courts and commentators have suggested will minimize any
conflicts. Finally, I will discuss those situations in which the conflicts
cannot be harmonized, and I will offer some guidelines and principles for
their reconciliation.
1. Historical Approach
One starting point, but one that ultimately turns out to be inconclusive
and thus unhelpful, is to look to the history of these two provisions. They
became parts of the Constitution relatively simultaneously. The
Constitution, including the Copyright Clause, was ratified in 1789. The Bill
of Rights, including the First Amendment, was adopted by Congress in
1790 and added to the Constitution in 1791.
18. See infra notes 359-67 and accompanying text (discussing New Era Publications
International v. Henry Holt & Co.).
19. See infra notes 300-09 and accompanying text (discussing Time, Inc. v. Bernard
Geis Associates).
20. See infra notes 325-31 and accompanying text (discussing Dr. Seuss Enterprises,
L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.).
21. See infta notes 381-88 and accompanying text (discussing Worldwide Church of
God v. Philadelphia Church of God).
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Because subsequently added constitutional provisions repeal or replace
inconsistent previous provisions, 2 one could draw the conclusion that the
First Amendment controls, and even if it does not make the copyright laws
"tunconstitutional," it limits any portion of those laws that significantly
abridge free speech or freedom of the press. But it is highly unlikely that in
1790 through 1791 the Founding Fathers intended to repeal or diminish the
authority conferred on Congress by the Copyright Clause, which had so
recently been placed in the Constitution. Strong support for this conclusion
is the fact that early Congresses, whose members included the very people
instrumental in drafting both the Constitution and the Bill of Rights,
enacted legislation pursuant to the delegation of authority in the Copyright
Clause, which conveyed exclusive rights to copyright owners, albeit of a
more limited nature and scope than under contemporary law.2
The opposite conclusion to draw from history might be that although
the First Amendment prohibits Congress from making laws which abridge
the freedom of speech, there is a carve-out from this prohibition for
legislation enacted pursuant to specific authority in Article 1. However,
certainly the explicit authority given to Congress to coin money2 would not
justify a statute requiring a portrait of Jesus on all coins, and the authority
given to Congress to regulate commerce 25 would not authorize a statute
22. Repeal may be done explicitly. For example, the Twenty First Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, which provided for prohibition of
alcohol. Also, the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the direct election of U.S.
Senators, repealed Article 1, Section 3, providing for their election by state legislatures.
More often, the repeal is implicit. For example, the Thirteenth Amendment, which
abolished slavery, and the provision in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment stating that
all persons born or naturalized in the United States are U.S. citizens, effectively repealed that
portion of Article 1, Section 2 which provides that in apportioning Representatives in the
House, one should count "the whole Number of free Persons," but only three-fifths of
persons "bound to Service for a Term of Years," the Constitution's euphemistic description
of slaves.
23. The first American copyright statute-the Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat.
124, 124 (repealed 1 802)--extended protection only to maps, charts and books; conferred on
the author only the exclusive rights to print, reprint, publish and vend; and conferred
protection for a term of fourteen years, renewable for an additional fourteen years if the
author survived the first term. The history of the expansion of copyright in the ensuing two-
plus centuries is reviewed in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194-201 (2003). See
generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGH-WAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX (2003).
24. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 5 ("The Congress shall have the Power to. .. corn
Money. .. )
25. See id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have the Power to ... regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .)
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barring the interstate transportation of newspapers critical of the President's
positions on health care reform. Similarly, I think it is equally obvious that
the authority the Copyright Clause confers could not be used to justify a
statute denying copyright protection to authors who criticize the
government's policy in Afghanistan, and granting protection only to those
who are in agreement.2  While that conclusion is intuitively obvious,2 the
extent of the limitations that flow from the effects on speech and from
content-based provisions is less clear.
Therefore, history alone does not indicate that either regime is given
28
supremacy. Rather, the relatively contemporaneous adoption of these two
provisions seems to suggest that the Founding Fathers were aware of the
important goals and values embodied in both of them, and believed that
they were not in conflict, but rather that they should be dealt with in
tandem. 29 In most cases, the two provisions have coexisted harmoniously.
26. See Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004) ("Content-
based prohibitions ... have the constant potential to be a repressive force in the lives and
thoughts of a free people. To guard against that threat the Constitution demands that
content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid ... and that the Government bear
the burden of showing their constitutionality.' (citations omitted)).
27. Although beyond the scope of this Article, I think it also obvious that other
hypothetical provisions in the copyright laws might run afoul of other constitutional
protections. For example, the Establishment Clause would bar a statute giving longer
copyright duration to essays discussing the Bible than those discussing the Koran, and a
number of provisions would invalidate a hypothetical statute denying copyright protection to
atheists.
28. There is only scanty legislative history for the Patent and Copyright Clause. James
Madison made one brief reference to it in the Federalist Papers:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of authors
has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The
right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.
The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.
The States cannot separately make effectual provisions for either of the cases,
and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at
the instance of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison); see Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual
Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress's Intellectual
Property Power, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1816 (2006) (examining records from the Constitutional
Convention, and concluding that the preambular part of the Copyright Clause "was intended
to limit Congress's intellectual property power").
The "legislative history" of the First Amendment is even less helpfuil. The discussion
and debates surrounding its adoption are quite limited on its scope and objectives, and are
void of any reference to its relationship with provisions of the original Constitution such as
the Copyright Clause.
29. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) ("The Copyright Clause and
First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers'
839
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But, on a number of occasions, conflicts have arisen. It is to the treatment
of these clashes in the past, and the treatment that they should have in the
future, that I now turn.
III. Addressing the Conflict
The most useful starting point for the analysis is an examination of the
nature of the conflict, and the different interests promoted by these two
constitutional provisions. The goals of both are well known.
A. Goals of the Systems
1. Copyright
The principal function of the copyright system is captured in the
preamble to the Copyright Clause: "[T]o promote the progress of
Science.. .. 03 0 The goal was the enhancement of the quantity and quality
of literary and artistic works. Although the vehicle for achieving this goal
was to be the conferral of certain exclusive rights, for a limited duration, on
the creators of copyrightable material or their assignees or heirs,' the
intended beneficiaries of this system were the members of the public.3 The
premise was that unlike earlier times, when an artist or musician might
create a work under the sponsorship of a wealthy patron, by the eighteenth
century, most creators of those and other kinds of works would be induced
to create more and better works if they were assured of some monetary
reward for their efforts. As noted, however, this incentive was merely the
means to the end of enriching the intellectual, cultural and artistic wealth of
society.
view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles.").
30. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 8. As used in this provision, "Science" was intended to
encompass, inter alia, literature and the arts, as opposed to the 'useful Arts," which were the
subject matter of the patent regime.
31. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
("'[The] limited grant [in the Copyright Clause] is a means by which an important public
purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward. . . ."' (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984))).
32. See id ("'The monopoly created by copyright thus rewards the individual author in
order to benefit the public."' (quoting Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 477 (1984)
(Blackmun, J. dissenting))).
840
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Secondarily, and more recently, some have erroneously suggested that
the copyright regime may serve a second function: the protection of the
privacy rights and other interests of creators of unpublished works. 3 With
respect to some works-for example, personal letters or entries in a diary-
the author does not seek the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute his
work.3 Instead, he does not want it ever to see the light of day. Parties
have invoked copyright infringement claims to assist in that endeavor. 
35
Alternatively, the author may want to have the work distributed eventually,
but in the meantime she will want to control the timing and location of that
first distribution. Again, authors have relied upon copyright to assure that
right.3
Under the regime prevailing under the Copyright Act of 1 90937 and its
predecessor statutes, only state-created, common law copyright protected
unpublished works; federal protection arose only after publication.3
However, the preemption provision of the Copyright Act of 1 976 39
provided that beginning in 1978, all copyright protection to works fixed in
a tangible medium of expression would be available solely under federal
law.4
0
Unlike the protection of commercial interests advanced by federal
protection for published works, common law copyright was indeed
designed in large measure to protect privacy interests. However, these
33. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FoRDHAm L. REv. 2537, 2579
(2009) ("This is not to say that all factors relevant to authorial fair use defenses cut only in
favor of fair use. Drawing expression from unpublished or unfinished works is likely to cut
against fair use.").
34. An analogous category includes previously published works which have become
out-of-print, but where copyright protection still subsists. See infra notes 381-88
(discussing Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God).
3 5. See infra notes 348-56 and accompanying text (discussing Salinger v. Random
House, Inc.).
36. See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text (discussing Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enterprises).
37. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 2, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909).
38. See id at 1076 ("[jN]othing in this Act shall be construed to annul or limit the right
of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent
the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to obtain
damages therefor.").
39. Copyright Act ofl1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-22 (2006).
40. See id § 301 (providing that protection for "works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright" are
governed exclusively by the Copyright Act). See generally Joseph P. Bauer, Addressing the
Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright Act of 1976. 10 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 1 (2007).
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interests are fundamentally inconsistent with the goals of copyright, as
stated in the preamble to Article 1, § 8: of promoting the creation and
dissemination of more and better creative works .4 '1 Therefore, the copyright
regime should not be available for the advancement of privacy interests.
Instead, as noted in the legislative history of the 1976 Act, one properly
brings claims for invasion of privacy only under state tort law.4
2. First Amendment
The various goals of the First Amendment have been the subject of
extensive discussion and of at least some controversy.4 The principal one
is the critical importance of full and unconstrained speech for maintenance
of the vitality of our democratic polity-critical both for the speaker and the
listener."4 Access to a range of information and viewpoints is essential in a
myriad of ways, as citizens seek to play some role in governance at the
federal, state and local levels-whether as voters, as correspondents to their
41. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power to. ... promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. .....)
42. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.AXN 5659,
5748 (noting that in the House version of the bill, the identification of the right of a privacy
claim as one not preempted by § 301 was illustrative of "rights and remedies that are
different in nature from the rights comprised in a copyright and that may continue to be
protected under State common law or statute"); see also infra notes 359-76 and
accompanying text (discussing New Era Publications International v. Henry Holt & Co.).
One court stated:
It is universally recognized .. . that the protection of privacy is not the function
of our copyright law .... [W]e have no need to create a protection of privacy
under the label of copyright. For in this country under state laws an explicitly
named right of privacy has developed through court decision and statute.
New Era Pubs. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1504"O (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
43. See generally ZECHARIAH- CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941);
ALEXANDER MEIKELJOAN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948);
CASS R. SuNsrEi, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Thomas
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963).
44. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("A broad dissemination of principles, ideas, and factual
information is crucial to the robust public debate and informed citizenry that are 'the essence
of self-government.' And every citizen must be permitted freely to marshal ideas and facts
in the advocacy of particular political choices." (citations omitted) (quoting Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964))).
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elected representatives or newspapers, as creators of a blog or Facebook
page, or as callers to the Rush Limbaugh show.4
However, the interests advanced by the First Amendment are hardly
limited to communications about political, social or economic issues. It
also encompasses communications in areas of the arts, entertainment and
culture. By extending its protection to all these areas, the First Amendment
also serves a value similar to that fostered by the copyright laws-
promoting the creation and dissemination of knowledge and cultural
artifacts. A regime authorizing the relatively unrestrained dissemination of
literary, musical, artistic or other creations, and permitting discussions of or
sharing information about those works, makes it more likely that new,
different and better works will be created.
The First Amendment serves a number of other functions. Access to
information and expression, and the ability to share or convey these to
others, are necessary for individuals, both as speakers and as listeners, in
advancing their personal self-fulfillment and helping to realize their
individual autonomy. It is not only that we feel better about ourselves when
we can share our viewpoints with, and attempt to persuade or enlighten,
others, but we also become better-informed and more well-rounded
members of society through conversations and dialogues and through
reading, writing, watching and listening.4
The First Amendment may also act as a societal safety valve. If
people feel less free to communicate either orally or in written form, they
may resort to less desirable forms of communication, including violent
methods .4 ' The freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment make it less
likely that those alternatives will be necessary.
45. See generally Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. R~v. 354 (1999) (emphasizing
free speech values in maintaining the diversity of antagonistic information sources).
46. The First Amendment's extension of protection to the reader and listener as well
as to the writer or speaker provides an interesting contrast to the concerns reflected by the
copyright regime. Because of the importance of being able to hear or read a broadly
unrestricted range of materials, persons denied access to those materials have standing to
assert a constitutional challenge. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) ("[Tjhe protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."). By contrast, although the person
who makes an unlawful copy of a work or sells that copy may be guilty of copyright
infringement, there is no copyright liability for reading or purchasing that copy, even if one
knows that it was unlawfully made or distributed.
47. The view that these alternative forms of communication are both undesirable and
unnecessary is reflected in decisions extending First Amendment protection to certain forms
of "expressive conduct." See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990)
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B. Reactions to Conflicts
As discussed below, potential conflicts between the copyright regime
and the First Amendment have arisen, and can arise, in a variety of
48
settings. Commentators and courts have expressed three different
responses. First, some argue that because the goals of the two systems are
consistent, the actual clashes are minimal or nonexistent .49 But because the
means used to achieve those goals are fundamentally different, that is not
my view. Rather, I contend that the limited monopoly conferred by the
copyright regime often interferes with the potentially uninhibited right of
reproduction and dissemination shielded by the First Amendment.50
Second, to the extent that those clashes are more significant, many
point to mechanisms internal to the copyright laws, which supposedly
suffice to accommodate First Amendment concerns. 51 The two principal
vehicles which supposedly serve this role are the idea-expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine. Other devices for achieving this
harmonization include the merger doctrine, the fixed terms of copyright
protection, the originality requirement for obtaining copyright, the first sale
doctrine, the limitation on the performance right to "~public"I performances,
and the grab-bag of exceptions, exemptions and compulsory licenses
scattered throughout the 1976 Copyright Act.5 I agree that these internal
mechanisms can and do ameliorate the conflict between the two regimes,
but once again, I do not believe that they adequately and fully address the
problem.
(concluding that the Flag Burning Act failed First Amendment scrutiny); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (concluding that the burning of a flag was "expressive conduct"
protected by the First Amendment); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968)
(rejecting a claim that the burning of a draft card was protected "symbolic speech"). But see
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 367 (2003) (concluding that the First Amendment does not
bar a state statute from banning cross burning carried on with the intent to intimidate).
48. See infra Part III.C.1I (noting that because this conflict arises in a variety of
settings, there is the potential for courts to "get it wrong").
49. See infra Part III.A (discussing the similar objectives of copyright and the First
Amendment).
50. See Triangle Pubs., Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 875, 882
(S.D. Fla. 1978) ("When the Copyright Act and the First Amendment both seek the same
objective, their future coexistence is easily assured. However, when they operate at cross-
purposes, the primacy of the First Amendment mandates that the Copyright Act be deprived
of effectuation.").
51. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing protection only for expression, the fair use
doctrine, limited duration, the merger doctrine and scenes 6~ faire, and other internal
mechanisms).
52. See infra Part III.B.2.e (discussing these internal mechanisms).
844
COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT84
Although there are a variety of reasons that these internal mechanisms
have sometimes proven inadequate to meet all First Amendment concerns,
two deserve highlighting. Preeminent has been the enormous growth,
initially under the 1976 Act itself, next from judicial interpretation of the
Act, and then through subsequent legislation, 53 of the scope and duration of
copyright and the rights and remedies available to the copyright owner.5
Second, the nature of copyrighted materials, and the expansion and
diversity of means of using and distributing those materials, give additional
opportunities for the values of the First Amendment to come into conflict
with those of the copyright laws .55 In light of these and other phenomena,
one means of redressing concerns for protection of First Amendment values
would be more robust application of these internal mechanisms.
However, I conclude that in some situations, a third response is also
required. On occasion, there will have to be some mechanisms external to
the copyright regime for allowing the variety and scope of communication
contemplated by a robust First Amendment, despite the objections of the
copyright owner. 56 This Article proposes such an alternative.
1. Minimizing the Conflict by Harmonization
One basis for diminishing the apparent conflict between copyright and
the First Amendment is the premise that both regimes share the samne goals.
As just noted, the objectives of both systems are to maximize the ,creation
and dissemination of information, ideas and expression,5 with the aim of
enhancing society's intellectual and cultural well-being.5 The related
53. Three of the principal post- 1976 statutes are the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
(VARA), affording moral rights to certain works of visual arts; the Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA or the Sonny Bono Act), discussed infra notes 158-87 and
accompanying text; and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA), discussed
infra note 248 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 245-48 and accompanying text (discussing several significant
changes in copyright law over the last three decades).
55. See infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text (discussing recent developments in
technology and their impact on the distribution of copyrighted material).
56. See infra Part III.C (discussing the advantages and the limits of an expanded
application of the First Amendment).
57. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text (showing that even this
commonality must be qualified because copyright does not protect information or ideas, but
only the expression of those ideas). But, as noted there and elsewhere, of course the ideas or
the underlying information are often intimately bound up with the expression thereof.
58. Cf Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 865 (5th
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assertion is that to the extent that copyright reduces the public's right to use
and disseminate certain expressive creations, the overall increase in
production of new works, resulting from the exclusivity given to the author
of the work, more than offsets any encroachment on First Amendment
values.
While the goals of these two regimes may be similar,5 the means to
achieve them are quite different. With the exception of limited categories
of speech or writing which are outside the pale of protection-for example,
obscenity,6 fighting words, slander and libel,6  or shouting fire in a
crowded theate r63 -the First Amendment generally allows the uninhibited
use of any words, pictures, music and so forth.64 These might be ideas and
expressions which are totally original to the speaker or writer or,
importantly, they may have originated elsewhere.6 On the other hand,
copyright seeks to expand the creation of new expressions by giving the
author the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute his or her works, and
Cir. 1979) (harmonizing the goals of both regimes-to increase the production and
dissemination of expressive ideas-by rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of
affording copyright protection to obscene works).
59. In fact, it is probably more likely that they overlap than that they are congruent.
At the risk of oversimplifying the distinction, although 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) clearly grants the
author of a work the exclusive right to distribute that work, the principal objective of
copyright law is to stimulate the creation of those works. On the other hand, the First
Amendment puts a premium on the fullest dissemination of works, regardless of whether the
person undertaking the distribution is the creator.
60. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (finding no First
Amendment protection for child pornography); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973)
(finding that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment).
61. See Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (finding that
the First Amendment protection does not extend to "insulting or 'fighting' words-those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace").
62. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 525 (1991) (authorizing
a defamation action); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1990) (same);
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (upholding a criminal libel statute).
63. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and
causing a panic.").
64. See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (refusing to expand the
limited categories of unprotected speech to the sale or possession of videos depicting animal
cruelty, and concluding that the Government's proposed test that would have balanced the
value of speech against societal costs was inconsistent with the First Amendment).
65. But see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (asserting that First
Amendment protection is more limited "when speakers assert the right to make other
people's speeches").
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to exclude others from making unauthorized uses thereof.66 The promise of
a limited monopoly in the expression is the vehicle for maximizing the
creation of new works.6
Thus, it is not merely that the means employed by these two regimes to
achieve their goals differ. They may at times be fundamentally
inconsistent.6 Therefore, the supposed similarity of objectives will often
be irrelevant in reconciling a clash between the owner of copyright in a
work, and rival claimants to some unauthorized use of that work. Dealing
with these potential clashes thus requires attention both to certain
mechanisms internal to the copyright regime, and, when these still prove
inadequate, to some external doctrines for reconciling those occasional
clashes.
2. Internal Mechanisms
There are numerous elements of the copyright regime which, while
perhaps not directly intended to address First Amendment concerns, do
ameliorate many free speech objections to affording broad copyright
protection .69  The two most important are the idea-expression dichotomy
and the fair use doctrine.
66. The optimal level of rights and remedies, which will maximize the creation and
dissemination of creative works while minimizing the costs imposed on users, is a subject of
much debate. See, e.g., id at 248-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (comparing the modest increase
in the incentive to expand the output resulting from the extension of a copyright term for an
additional twenty years, with a significant loss to society from delayed access to those
materials). It would be particularly difficult to determine the extent to which creativity
would be diminished by First Amendment-derived expanded access to copyrighted
materials.
67. With respect to differences in the goals of the copyright laws and the First
Amendment and the means used to achieve those ends, there is an interesting analogy to
attempts to reconcile the antitrust and intellectual property regimes. Both regimes are said to
share the goal of maximizing consumer welfare-the production of more and better products
at lower prices. However, antitrust seeks to achieve this goal by fostering competition and
making certain forms of collusion or monopoly unlawful. By contrast, as just noted, the
intellectual property regime-and here that includes copyright-seeks to achieve those goals
by conferring limited monopolies on authors and inventors. See generally Joseph P. Bauer,
Refusals to Deal with Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copyrights: Reflections on the
lImage Technical and Xerox Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. Ray. 1211 (2006).
68. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 244 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[A] particular statute that
exceeds proper Copyright Clause bounds may set Clause and Amendment at cross purposes,
thereby depriving the public of the speech-related benefits that the Founders, through both,
have promised.").
69. See id. at 219 (majority opinion) ("[The] copyright scheme. .. incorporates its
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a. Protection Only for Expression
It has long been a core tenet of the copyright laws that protection
extends only to the particular expression used by the author .70  The
underlying idea of the work-of taking a photograph of the Statue of
Liberty, or authoring a narrative of the trials and tribulations of star-crossed
lovers-is itself not protectable. It is the photographer's choice of film,
lighting, exposure, timing, and so forth, or the playwright's choice of
medium, words, order of events, setting, character details, and the like,
which obtain protection.712 This doctrine has been formally embodied in the
1976 Act.7
Related to this doctrine is the absence of protection for facts, data and
other kinds of information. While the selection or assembly of that
information may achieve protection, the underlying information itself
remains free for all to use, regardless of the effort or cost involved in
discovering and disclosing it.
7 5
own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.... [Clopyright law contains built-in First
Amendment accommodations.").
70. See id. ("Due to [the idea-expression] distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a
copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of
publication.").
7 1. Id
72. See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, III U.S. 53, 61 (1884)
(finding that photographs may be original works, satisfying the constitutional requirement
for protection); Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 93 1-32 (2d Cu. 1914) (concluding that a
second photograph of the same subject as the first, with a similar pose and lighting, among
other things, infringed the first photograph).
A frequently posed hypothetical, to illustrate the proposition that the protection for a
dramatic work extends beyond the bare words and place and character names, asks whether
Leonard Bernstein's musical West Side Story would have been an infringing work if
Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet were not in the public domain.
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) ("In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated or embodied in such work.").
74. See id. § 103(a) ("The subject matter of copyright .. , includes compilations.
id § 10 1 (defining "compilation" as "a work formed by the collection and assembling of pre-
existing material or data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the
resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship").
75. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 217 (2003) ("[C]opyright gives the holder
no monopoly on any knowledge. A reader of an author's writing may make fuill use of any
fact or idea she acquires from her reading."); Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 351-60 (1991) (concluding that the 1976 Act rejected the "sweat of the brow
doctrine,' which gave protection to arduously collected factual information, and instead
established "originality" as the touchstone for copyright protection); Iowa State Univ.
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Defenders of expansive copyright protection in the face of free speech
or press objections assert that First Amendment concerns are not raised
because the copyright laws only restrict the use by someone of the author's
expression.7 Speakers and writers remain free to convey their own ideas,
share their concerns, and seek to inform or persuade others, as long as they
do not do so by borrowing someone else's original words or expressions. 
77
That assertion, however, is incomplete and inaccurate.7
Research Found. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The public interest in
the free flow of information is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a valid copyright in
facts.").
In the wake of Feist, there have been numerous proposals to give enhanced statutory
protection to databases and other collections of facts, names, addresses and the like. See,
e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act, H.R. 3261, 108th Cong.
(2004); Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. (1999);
Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. (1999); Collections of
Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998); Database Investment and
Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act, H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996).
In addition to the Copyright Clause obstacles to such legislation identified by Feist,
such a statute obviously would severely constrict one of the internal mechanisms identified
as accommodating free speech concerns. By erecting additional barriers to the ability of
persons to convey and receive factual information, the vitality of political, economic and
social discourse could be seriously inhabited. These proposals would therefore also give rise
to significant First Amendments objections.
See Daniel J. Gervais, The Protection of Databases, 82 Ciu.-KENT L. Ruv. 1109, 1142-
47 (2007) (noting constitutional concerns about database protection); Yijun Tian, Reform of
Existing Database Legislation and Future Database Legislation Strategies: Towards a
Better Balance in the Database Law, 31 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 347, 362 (2005)
(arguing for sui generis legal protection of databases).
76. See Eldred, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) ("Due to [the idea-expression] distinction,
every idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public
exploitation at the moment of publication."); Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters.,
471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) ("In view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in
the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts
and ideas. ... we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use .... "1).
77. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 ("The First Amendment securely protects the freedom
to make-or decline to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers assert
the right to make other people's speeches.").
78. Cf Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the
URAA, which restored copyright in certain works that had fallen into the public domain, is
subject to First Amendment scrutiny); see infra notes 196-209 and accompanying text
(discussing the fact that the idea-expression dichotomy is not a sufficient safeguard of First
Amendment interests, because absent the URAA, the public would be able to make
unrestricted use of the expression embodied in those works as well as of the ideas). See
generally Alfred Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy
and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and Feel", 3 8 EMORY L.J. 393 (1989).
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First, the boundary between idea and expression is anything but a
bright line; rather, it is blurry and often a moving target.7 9 Often one cannot
know if one has made a protected expression until a court has spoken.8
Thus, the prudent, or risk-averse, speaker or writer may desist from using
photographs, words or other copyrighted material even if a court might later
find such behavior would have been permissible.8 ' This necessary strategy
flies in the face of the First Amendment's well-known chilling effect
doctrine, in which courts hold uncertain or problematic rules
unconstitutional because the rules can lead speakers to avoid what may well
turn out to be desirable, protectable speech. 82 Indeed, the negative effect of
this uncertainty on speech is a principal concern of the broader protection
for copyrightable works.
Second, amid the panoply of decisions on this issue, some courts have
taken an increasingly expansive view of what constitutes expression.8
Despite the repetition of the importance of promoting First Amendment
values,8 such a shift in the boundary between protected expression and
79. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mufflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11Ith Cir. 2001)
("There is no bright line that separates the protectable expression from the non-protectable
idea in a work of fiction."); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487,
489 (2d Cir. 1960) ("Obviously, no principle can be stated as to when an imitator has gone
beyond copying the 'idea,' and has borrowed its 'expression.' Decisions must therefore
inevitably be ad hoc.').
80. See Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 587-88 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The distinction
between an idea and its expression is an elusive one."); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp.,
630 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1980) (characterizing the distinction as "an imprecise tool' and
noting that "often the determination is a matter of degree"); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (noting that ideas can be expressed with ever-
increasing generality, and that at some ill-defined point, copyright protection will no longer
be available, and observing that "the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary").
81. The likelihood that even the possibility of a lawsuit can lead to a decision not to
engage in borderline behavior will be exacerbated in the majority of potential infringement
situations by the disparity in resources between the copyright owner and the typical alleged
infringer, and their balancing of the costs and risks of litigation.
82. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72 (1997) ("The
vagueness of such a regulation raises special First Amendment concerns because of its
obvious chilling effect on free speech."); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52
(1988) (expressing concern for the "'chilling' effect on speech relating to public figures");
Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) ("[Sluch a 'chilling' effect
would be antithetical to the First Amendment's protection of true speech on matters of
public concern.... "). But see Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 411,
422 (D.N.J. 2005) ("Copyright law .. . recognizes no 'chilling effect doctrine."').
83. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REv. 1, 19 (2001) (noting that "expression has steadily gobbled up idea").
84. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters:, 471 U.S. 539, 589-90 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("To ensure the progress of arts and sciences and the integrity of
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unprotected ideas and facts carries the risk of significantly inhibiting
protected communications.
Third, the assertion that copyright only protects against copying, and
that speakers are free to express ideas as long as it is done in their own
words,8 fails to acknowledge the breadth of copyright protection.
Copyright not only protects against a partial and imperfect as well as a
complete and exact "reproduction of a work" ;86 it also gives the copyright
owner the exclusive right to prepare "derivative works" based upon the
work.87 Thus, a second speaker may be found to infringe, even if he or she
uses a different vehicle or mode to express the earlier idea. 8 The numerous
cases involving parodies and satires, in which courts have rejected First
Amendment claims for works which were based on a preexisting work, are
illustrations of the inadequacy of this supposed internal mechanism.
89
Finally, and perhaps most important, there may be a variety of
communications which require, or at a minimum will be far more
understandable and persuasive based on, the use of the copyrighted
expression itself, and where rephrasing or describing it will simply not be
effective. 90 Some examples of these are discussed below.9'
First Amendment values, ideas and information must not be freighted with claims of
proprietary right." (footnote omitted)).
85. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (explaining that one has a right to
make one's own speech but not someone else's speech).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006).
87. Id. § 106(2). A "derivative work" is broadly defined as "any ... form in which a
work can be recast, transformed or adapted." Id. § 101.
88. Thus, it has been suggested that although a second user may not freely copy the
original work, the ability to paraphrase that work satisfies free speech concerns. The
copyright owner's right to make a derivative work can severely limit the rights of others to
use the work, even after making significant modifications. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding infringement based on a biographer's
paraphrasing of passages in J.D. Salinger's letters), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
89. See, e.g., infra notes 325-31 and accompanying text (discussing Dr. Seuss
Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Bookcs USA, Inc.); infra note 331 (discussing Walt Disney
Productions v. Air Pirates).
90. Cf Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(recognizing that the defendant's decision to quote, rather than paraphrase, from plaintiff's
work was not intended "to save his own time, or to exploit plaintiff s efforts, but to analyze
these personal accounts in the most effective and persuasive manner").
91. See infra Part III.C.2.b (explaining that the First Amendment should prevail over
copyright when there is a strong public interest in free use of the material, there is a
compelling need to use the protected expression, and consent to the use of the material is
unavailable).
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b. Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine is the second major mechanism internal to the
copyright regime which is proffered as a supposed cushion against
abridgment of First Amendment rights.9 This doctrine permits persons to
make certain uses of a work protected by copyright without obtaining
permission from the copyright owner. The doctrine was originally the
product of common law, but for the past three-plus decades, it has been
codified by statute.
The origins of the fair use doctrine in the United States are often traced
to an 1841 opinion by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, sitting as a trial
judge.93 For the next century-plus, the doctrine was expanded, limited and
refined by countless other decisions.94 Then, in 1976, Congress codified
the doctrine in Section 107 of the Copyright Act.95 Two aspects of the
provision are noteworthy.
First, the preambular portion, § 107, sets forth six examples of
unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work which are more likely to be
deemed fair use: "[C]riticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."
9 6
However, it does not follow that all instances of these six forms of conduct
will be deemed "fair use."9 7 Also, many other form of conduct, which are
92. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (identifyring the fair use doctrine
as a "built-in First Amendment accommodation[]"); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline
Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999) ("First Amendment concerns are protected by
and coextensive with the fair use doctrine."). But see Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
273 F.3d 429, 458 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[T]he Supreme Court has never held that fair use is
constitutionally required, although some isolated statements in its opinions might arguably
be enlisted for such a requirement.").
93. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) ("[lt is a clear invasion
of the right of property of the plaintiffs, if the copying of parts of a work, not constituting a
major part, can ever be a violation thereof.... If it had been the case of a fair and bona fide
abridgment of the work of the plaintiffs, it might have admitted of a very different
consideration.").
94. While the details are not relevant here, it is hardly surprising that over the years,
courts have applied a variety of criteria to determine whether any particular use was fair, and
that those decisions have often been inconsistent.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
96. Id
97. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985)
(finding that the copying of a portion of President Ford's memoirs by a news magazine did
not qualify' as a "fair use").
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not within these six enumerated uses, may well qualify as fair use if the
factors set forth in the statute are met. 
98
Second, the statute sets forth four factors which are to be considered in
"determining whether the use made of a work in a particular case is a fair
use."99 These include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is
of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 100
Courts have repeatedly asserted that the fair use doctrine provides a
significant bulwark to claims that the copyright laws impinge on First
Amendment interests. 10' And, in a large number of cases, the right to make
fair use of copyrighted materials has in fact served as a satisfactory answer
to those concerns. 0 There are a number of reasons that the doctrine has
proven to be an incomplete response.
98. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984)
(finding that a private individual's use of video cassette recorders to make copies of audio-
visual works which were broadcast to the public constituted fair use).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219-20 (2003) (characterizing fair use
as one of copyright law's "built-in First Amendment accommodations"); Harper & Row,
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (characterizing fair use as one of the
"First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act[]"); Sari Louis
Ferraud Int'l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 482 (2d Cir. 2007) ("[A]bsent extraordinary
circumstances, 'the fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of first amendment in the
copyright field."' (citations omnitted)); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting "that First Amendment concerns in copyright are allayed by the
presence of the fair use defense," and that "[ulses of copyrighted material that are not fair
uses are rightfully enjoined").
102. See Triangle Pubs., Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1178
(5th Cir. 1980) (finding that the fair use doctrine shielded the defendant-newspaper's use of
the cover of the plaintiff magazine in comparative advertising, but that the district court,
which had rejected the fair use defense, should not have protected that use on the basis of the
First Amendment); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1435 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (applying the fair use defense, and recognizing that copyright "policy must yield to the
right of persons to engage in full and free public discourse of ideas and issues protected by
the First Amendment").
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On the one hand, there are instances where the courts arguably had to
stretch the fair use doctrine to protect First Amendment values. While not
destructive of those values, these decisions nonetheless undermine the
predictability and integrity of fair use.
On the other hand, and far more problematic, there are a number of
cases where the fair use defense was rejected by the courts,03adtu
where the interests fostered by the First Amendment were undermined. 
104
There are a number of factors contributing to this result.'05  Of primary
concern, the fair use defense suffers the same two defects as were identified
above with respect to the idea-expression dihtm' 0 6-its imprecision
and its recent expansion.
First, because it is obvious that different courts often apply the same
factors to the same facts and reach different results,' 07 a potential user of a
103. For examples of cases in which the fair use defense was rejected by courts, see
infra notes 311-18, 325-31, 341-42, & 348-76 and accompanying text. See also Estate of
Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11lth Cir. 1999) (declining
to address fair use and First Amendment issues in an action challenging a television
network's use of excerpts from Dr. King's "I Have a Dream" speech in a documentary
because the district court did not address these defenses and the facts were not fully
developed); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068-71 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding triable
issues of fact and denying summary judgment on the fair use defense, but declining to
discuss First Amendment issues, in a case involving copying of portions of letters written by
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were executed in 1953 for conspiracy to transmit
information to the Soviet Union).
104. Needless to say, there are many cases where the court found the fair use doctrine
inapplicable and then properly concluded that the First Amendment did not shield the
defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters,
Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1187-88 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that the defendant's imitative
poster did not qualify as protected satire or parody under the fair use doctrine and that the
First Amendment defense was unavailable); Wainwright Secs. Inc. v. Wall St. Transcript
Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[Alppellants have failed to demonstrate that their use
of the Wainwright reports either was reasonable or pursuant to legitimate news reporting that
implicates first amendment interests."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
105. The identification of the reasons that the fair use doctrine does not adequately
address First Amendment concerns could be part of a broader critique of the fair use
doctrine. While I have some reservations both about aspects of the doctrine generally and
about the construction given it by some courts, I do not argue here that the long history of
fair use jurisprudence is flawed. Instead, I assert that regardless of the correctness of fair use
analysis, the First Amendment should be applied more broadly in the face of copyright
infringement claims, to give greater protection to free speech interests.
106. See supra notes 79-91 and accompanying text (discussing the defects associated
with the idea-expression dichotomy).
107. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this imprecision would be a citation to the
dozens, or probably hundreds, of cases in which an appellate court reversed the judgment of
the lower court that the fair use defense was, or was not, applicable. See, e.g., Harper &
Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985) (reversing the court of
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work may have great difficulty predicting whether her unauthorized use
will be permitted. The prudent and risk-averse user will desist from that
use-resulting in the chilling effect that First Amendment courts often
decry.108
Second, by identifying the "effect of the [defendant's] use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"' 09 as the factor
entitled to the greatest weight in copyright infringement analysis, the
Supreme Court has significantly limited the scope of the fair use defense."I 
0
The Court has further limited the defense by interpreting that factor not
only to include the potential impact of the defendant's use on the market for
the work in its original form, but also the potential loss of the opportunity to
create or authorize others to make derivative uses of that work.''
Third, the four factors enumerated in § 107 for determining whether a
particular use is fair do not include what is probably the most compelling
concern embodied in the First Amendment: the public interest, or even
public necessity, in permitting unauthorized use of certain copyrighted
material."1 2  The closest that the Copyright Act's textual enumeration of
appeals's holding that the use in question was protected by fair use doctrine); Suntrust Bank
v. Houghton Mufflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276-77 (11lth Cir. 2001) (reversing the district
court's holding that the use in question was not protected by fair use doctrine).
108. See generally Alan Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright
Law, 35 HOFsTRA L. R.Ev. 1169, 1195 (2007) (noting the chilling effect of "the prospect of
having to litigate even a successful First Amendment defense"); William McGeveran,
Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IowA L. REv. 49, 52 (2008) (noting that the "lethal
combination of uncertain standards with lengthy and costly litigation creates a classic
chilling effect upon the unlicensed use of trademarks to facilitate speech, even when such
uses are perfectly lawful"); see supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing the chilling
effect doctrine).
109. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
110. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) ("[The effect
on the potential market for the original (and the market for derivative works) is 'undoubtedly
the single most important element of fair use. .. ."' (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
566)); see also Mulcahy v. Cheetah Learning LLC, 386 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 2004)
(same); Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 189 (D. Mass. 2007) ("Since
this question goes to the heart of whether allowing or prohibiting a use furthers the ends of
the Copyright Act, market effect is 'undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
use. "' (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566)).
111. See Mark P. McKenna, The Rehnquist Court and the Groundwork for Greater
First Amendment Scrutiny of Intellectual Property, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 23 (2006)
("Two related trends in fair use law over the last twenty-some years have worked together to
loosen fair use from whatever First Amendment core it once had.").
112. I contend that the public interest in allowing unauthorized copying or other use of
a work, even in situations where the fair use doctrine might not apply, is a key factor in
determining whether First Amendment considerations should trump copyright claims. See
infra Part III.C.2.b.(l) (discussing the importance of considering the public interest in
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factors comes to considering this public interest is the first, vague factor."'
Rather than undertaking any consideration of "public interest," however,
courts weighing this factor have focused almost exclusively on the two
distinctions specified in this subsection-"whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.""11
4
Fourth, fair use analysis focuses on how much the defendant took from
the plaintiff's work, regardless of whether the materials used constituted
only a small portion of the defendant's final product." 5 It may not matter
that the amount taken is a small fraction of the plaintiffs work." 6 From a
First Amendment perspective, it would be important not only to see how
much or how little the defendant took, but its context-both the quantity
used and its importance to the defendant-in the challenged
communication.
Fifth, decisions such as the Pretty Woman case" 7 highlight a
distinction which may be significantly important for fair use analysis, but
which can have unintended implications for First Amendment purposes." 
8
deciding when First Amendment values should prevail over copyright claims).
113. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(l) ("In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include .. , the purpose and
character of the use . . . .)
114. Id. Arguably, the preambular specification of examples of uses which are likely to
be deemed fair affords leeway for taking account of a public interest. See supra notes 98-
100 and accompanying text (discussing the six examples of unauthorized use likely to be
deemed fair use in the preamble to § 107). Here, too, there is nearly a complete lack of
attention to the public interest benefits of such uses as criticism, comment, or news
reporting. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (considering the purpose, nature,
amount, and effect of the use, but not its public interest benefits).
115. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985) ("[A]
taking may not be excused merely because it is insubstantial with respect to the infringing
work.").
116. See, e.g., id at 569 (finding infringement based on defendant's unauthorized use
of approximately 300 protected words from plaintiffs approximately 200,000 word
manuscript, in part because of the great importance and value of those words); Roy Export
Co. Estab. of Vaduz v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(finding that unauthorized use of a fifty-five second excerpt from a one hour and twenty-nine
minute film constituted a substantial use), affd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 826 (1982); see also Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d
57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1980) (denying the fair use defense to a broadcaster which used
approximately 8% of the plaintiffs twenty-eight minute film biography of a champion
wrestler in connection with telecasts of sports events).
117. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (reversing the
judgment of the court of appeals that the commercial nature of 2 Live Crew's parody of "Oh,
Pretty Woman" rendered it presumptively unfair); see also infra notes 29 1-92 and
accompanying text (discussing Campbell).
118. See Campbell, 5 10 U.S. at 591 (drawing the distinction between mere duplication
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There, the Supreme Court contrasted "mere duplication" of a work from a
"transformative" use." 9 Because duplication is far more likely to act as a
substitute for the underlying work, thus diminishing the copyright owner's
monetary rewards, the defendant's burden of prevailing on the fourth
factor120 is much higher. 121 In contrast, the Court favored transformative
use-the creation of a derivative work based on the underlying work-for
two reasons: it was less likely to displace demand for the original work,1
2 2
and it gave rise to a new work which contributed to society's cultural or
artistic resources. 12
3
From a First Amendment perspective, however, the distinction often
will point in the opposite direction. On occasion, a speaker or writer may
find it necessary to use precisely the same expression as the copyrighted
work; indeed, the value and strength of the communication would be
undermined if she were required to make some transformation to invoke the
benefits of the fair use doctrine. While the creation of derivative uses
should be promoted,124 the fact that the activity is not transformative should
not be a barrier to appropriate invocation of the First Amendment.1
2
1
for commercial purposes and transformative use).
119. Id
120. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) ("[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.").
121. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 ("[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere
duplication of the entirety of an original, it clearly 'supersede[s] the objects,' . . . of the
original and serves as a market replacement for it, making it likely that cognizable market
harm to the original will occur." (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Gas. 342, 248 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841)).
122. See id. ("But when, on the contrary, the second use is transformative, market
substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.").
123. Id at 579 ("[T~he goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works.... [T~he more transformative the new
work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use." (citations omnitted)).
124. Even this objective is subject to the obvious limitation that, absent fair use, the
statute gives the copyright owner the exclusive right "to prepare derivative works based
upon the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
125. Because my objective is to place the primary focus of the analysis on the values
underlying the First Amendment, rather than on advancing the interests of present and future
authors in creating new works or protecting existing works, I agree with Professor Tushnet
that making the legality of the unauthorized use of another's work turn on whether the
speech is transformative is inadequate to achieve a proper balance. See Rebecca Tushnet,
Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It,
114 YALE L.J. 535, 538 (2004) ("The current version of copyright, in which free speech
problems are solved by keeping copyright owners from controlling certain transformative
uses but in which more ordinary unauthorized copying is prohibited, is incompatible with the
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Sixth, another factor considered in fair use analysis-the "character of
the [defendant's] use" 12-may alopoint in opposite directions for
copyright versus free speech purposes. In a number of cases discussed
below,127 the defendant was unsuccessful in obtaining permission to use the
copyrighted work. For fair use purposes, it has been suggested that this is
evidence pointing against fair use.128 However, one factor in the test that I
propose, which would counsel in favor of finding that the First Amendment
should trump copyright claims, is the set of situations in which the
subsequent user does not have alternatives to the unauthorized use of the
plaintiff's work.129
Seventh, courts have held that fair use is an affirmative defense;
therefore, the burden of showing that the factors are met is placed on the
defendant.13 0 First Amendment concerns would be far more appropriately
addressed if the tables were turned-if there were a presumption in favor of
the primacy of allowing unconstrained speech, and if, after plausible free
speech arguments have been asserted, the burden were placed on the
copyright owner to show that the defendant's use was ipoe.13 1
First Amendment."). It is true that copyright law stresses the importance of the
transformative character of an unauthorized use in determining whether it is fair. See 17
U.S.C. § 107 (listing four factors to be considered in determining whether an unauthorized
use constitutes fair use); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591
(1994) (stressing the importance of transformative use in fair use analysis). However, there
are occasions on which even a purely duplicative use should receive First Amendment
protection.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
127. See, e.g., infra notes 29 1-92 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.); infra notes 348-56 and accompanying text (discussing Salinger v.
Random House, Inc.); infra notes 300-10 and accompanying text (discussing Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Associates).
128. For example, in L.A. News Services v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, the court noted:
While the fact that [the defendant] had requested a license but had been refu~sed
one is not dispositive, .... the propriety of the defendant's conduct" is relevant
to the character of the use at least to the extent that it may knowingly have
exploited a purloined work for free that could have been obtained for a fee.
L.A. News Services v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997).
129. See infra Part III.C.2.b.(2) (providing an exception when there is a compelling
need to use the protected expression).
130. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 ("Since fair use is an affirmative defense, its
proponent would have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use without
favorable evidence about relevant markets."); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1403 (9th Cir.) ("Since fair use is an affirmative defense,
[defendants] must bring forward favorable evidence about relevant markets."), cert. denied,
521 U.S. 1194 (1997); infra note 151 (discussing the burden of proof for a fair use defense).
13 1. By providing that "the fair use of a copyrighted work .. . is not an infringement of
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Eighth, and finally, the key factor in copyright infringement analysis-
the "effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work" 13 2 -may often be irrelevant for First Amendment
analysis. Admittedly, there may be some negative financial impact on the
copyright owner from the unauthorized use, but that is an unintended
consequence of that use. Rather, typically the speaker in situations in
which First Amendment concerns are implicated is not primarily seeking
financial rewards from that use, but rather is motivated by a desire to
enlighten or persuade others. 
13 1
The inadequacy of fair use as a mechanism to satisfy First Amendment
concerns is demonstrated by consideration of illustrative decisions. One
leading case, Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,3 arose out
of the publication by The Nation magazine of excerpts of President Gerald
Ford' s memoirs before their publication in book form. 13 ' Ford's publisher,
Harper & Row, had entered into a contract with Time magazine for pre-
publication serialization of the memoirs; the contract allowed Time to
withdraw if the memoirs were summarized elsewhere. 136 After acquiring a
copyright," the statute could be read as creating a presumption in favor of fair use, which
would have to be rebutted by the plaintiff. 17 U.S.C. § 107. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court has held on numerous occasions that the burden of proof rests on the party seeking to
suppress a particular communication, to show that it is not shielded by the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Illinois ex reL Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 n.9
(2003) ("The Court has long cautioned that, to avoid chilling protected speech, the
government must bear the burden of proving that the speech it seeks to prohibit is
unprotected."); Thomas v. Chicago School Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002) ("[T~he censor
must bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech and must bear the burden of
proof once in court." (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 494 U.S. 215, 227 (1990)); Elrod v.
Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 368 (1976) ("[lt is the government's burden to demonstrate an
overriding interest in order to validate an encroachment on protected [First Amendment]
interests. . . .")
132. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4); supra notes 109-11 (discussing the fourth factor in a fair use
determination and noting that this determination has been allotted the greatest consideration
by the courts).
133. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (noting that prior to the unauthorized use, the defendant had unsuccessfully sought the
copyright owner's permission to reproduce plaintiffs work, and had offered to pay a royalty
equal to the profits from publication of the book in return for permission); infra notes 300-
10 (discussing Time). Cf Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985) ("The crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction [in a § 107(l) analysis] is ... whether
the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the
customary price.").
134. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 569.
135. Idat 541-43.
136. Id. at 542-43.
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copy of the manuscript,' 3 ' The Nation published a short article, totaling
2,250 words, which incorporated approximately 300 words from President
Ford's memoirs.138  Time backed out, and Harper & Row sued for
damages.13 9 Reversing the decision of the Second Circuit holding for the
defendant,140 the Supreme Court rejected The Nation's proffered fair use
defense and found copyrght infringement. 
14 1
Although the Court's rejection of the fair defense might be criticized
on a number of grounds, two deserve emphasis. Because these criticisms
demonstrate that the Court "got it wrong," they also provide firm
illustration why reliance on the fair use doctrine has proven insufficient to
protect First Amendment interests.
Initially, the Court misread and misapplied one of the four factors in
§ 107. The Act provides for consideration of "the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."'1
42
Here, the defendant had used 300 words from a book that was 655 pages in
typescript form'143 and was approximately 200,000 words in length'"-a
taking of approximately 0.1% of "the copyrighted work as a whole."14 1
Instead, the Court erroneously focused on the ratio of 300 words to the
defendant's 2,250-word article, and thus its math indicated that "the direct
takings from the unpublished manuscript constitute at least 13% of the
infringing article."'146
137. A first-time reader of the decision would have known that things weren't going to
turn out well for the defendant when Justice O'Connor, in the first paragraph of the opinion,
stated that The Nation's editor was working with "the purloined manuscript." Id. at 542.
13 8. Id at 545-46.
139. See id. at 543 ("As a result of The Nation's article, Time canceled its piece and
refuised to pay the remaining $12,500. Petitioners brought suit in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, alleging conversion, tortious interference with contract, and
violations of the Copyright Act.").
140. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 208-09 (2d Cir.
1983) (finding that borrowing an "infinitesimal" amount of protected language does not
constitute a violation of copyright).
141. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
143. Harper &Row, 471 U.S. at 570.
144. See id at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court holds that The Nation's [sic]
quotation of 300 words from the unpublished 200,000-word manuscript of President Gerald
R. Ford infringed the copyright in that manuscript, even though the quotations related to a
historical event of undoubted significance-the resignation and pardon of President Richard
M. Nixon.").
145. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing the third requirement of
§ 107).
146. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565.
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Far more problematic for First Amendment purposes was the Court's
analysis of the fourth factor-the one characterized as "the single most
important element of fair use" 147--the effect on the market for the plaintiffs
work.'148 The Court observed that after the appearance of The Nation's article,
Time magazine decided to exercise its rights under its contract not to run its
own excerpts of President Ford's memoirs, and that this had resulted in
financial losses for Harper & Row.'14 9  Yet as Justice Brennan observed in
dissent, it is not at all clear whether Time's decision flowed from the
defendant's unauthorized use of the protected expression, or from its
publication of unprotected facts regarding the Nixon pardon.' 50 It is not
unlikely that Time would have made the same decision even if The Nation had
completely paraphrased Ford's memoirs, and had not used a single protected
expression. By failing to insure that the adverse effect on the market for the
memoirs resulted from unauthorized use of protected expression, rather than
The Nation's use of unprotected ideas and information,"'' the Court gave far
too little regard to the importance of broad and rapid dissemination of ideas and
information-the very values that are advanced by the First Amendment.
My criticism of Harper & Row then leads to the question of whether the
fair use doctrine as an "internal mechanism" is inadequate because of the
doctrine itself, or because of its judicial interpretation. The answer is "both."
For the reasons already indicated,'512 the doctrine does not reach far enough to
encompass all First Amendment concerns. Its inadequacy is compounded by
the often-cr-amped, and too-often-inconsistent, treatment it receives from the
courts-creating the chilling effect on speech which I have identified as a core
concern resulting from the First Amendment-copyright clash.' 
53
147. See supra note 1 10 (discussing the importance of the effect on the potential market
for the original).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
149. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 543 (1985).
150. See id at 602 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("If it was this publication of information,
and not the publication of the few quotations, that caused Time [sic] to abrogate its
serialization agreement, that effect was the product of wholly legitimate activity.").
151. In part, this was because the Court placed the burden of proof on "the infringer to
show that this damage would have occurred had there been no taking of copyrighted
expression." Id. at 567 (majority opinion). Because fair use is a defense, that allocation of
the burden is not inappropriate from the perspective of the copyright regime. Because the
First Amendment protects valuable rights, however, a concern for free speech values would
indicate that the burden should not be on the person who seeks to exercise those rights, but
on those who would deny them.
152. See supra notes 92-133 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of
the fair use doctrine).
153. My concerns for these chilling effects are accentuated by a variety of expansions
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c. Limited Duration
The constitutional requirement that the exclusive rights available to the
copyright owner may be granted only for "limited Times" 514 could, in theory,
of the scope of copyright protection, and in particular the grant of para-copyrights by the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-05), and by other legislation. See infra note 248 and
accompanying text (discussing the DMCA).
In Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, I111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 309-11 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), the defendants had created computer software which decrypted, and permitted others to
make copies of, digitally encrypted movies on DVDs; the defendants also widely distributed
this software over the Internet. The district court held that this conduct violated the DMCA,
rejecting, inter alia, the defendants' fair use and First Amendment defenses. Id. at 323.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of an injunction which
barred the defendant from posting the software on websites, or from knowingly linking a
website to any other website which contained the software. Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459-60 (2d Cir. 2001). The court of appeals initially concluded that
although the software program itself was speech for First Amendment purposes, the computer
code combined both speech and nonspeech elements. See id at 449 ("For all of these reasons,
we join the other courts that have concluded that computer code, and computer programs
constructed from code can merit First Amendment protection,..,. although the scope of such
protection remains to be determined." (citations omnitted)). Importantly, it found that the
injunction was content-neutral, and therefore it needed only to meet an intermediate scrutiny
test, rather than the strict scrutiny that would have been required if it were content-based. See
id. at 454 (discussing the standard for content-neutral actions). Applying the more relaxed
standard, the court found that both injunctive provisions served substantial government
interests, that those interests were unrelated to the suppression of free speech and, critically,
that any incidental restrictions on the defendant's speech did not burden substantially more
speech than was necessary to further those interests. Id. at 45 1.
For those who would rely on the fair use doctrine as a justification for more limited First
Amendment protection, the district court's rejection of that defense is particularly problematic.
The court held that while fair use applies to charges of infringement, it is simply inapplicable to
the conduct prohibited by § 120 1(a) of the Act, such as offering and providing technology
designed to circumvent technological measures that control access to copyrighted works. Id at
458-59. "The fact that Congress elected to leave technologically unsophisticated persons who
wish to make fair use of encrypted copyrighted works without the technical means of doing so
is a matter for Congress unless Congress' decision contravenes the Constitution .....
Reimerdes, I111 F. Supp. 2d at 324.
Corley's analysis was followed by 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., in
which the court applied the intermediate scrutiny test and concluded that the provisions of the
DMCA, which precluded the plaintiff from trafficking in devices which allowed third parties to
infringe copyrights in the defendants' DVDs, was not unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, and that the DMCA did not impermissibly burden the fair use rights of users of
copyrighted materials. 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d
1085, 1107-08 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Corley's analysis then discussed United States v. Elcom Ltd.,
mn which the court did likewise, but in a criminal prosecution. United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203
F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1127-37 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
154. See supra note I and accompanying text (discussing the Copyright Clause).
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serve as a means of accommodating First Amendment interests. To begin with,
however, most speakers seeking to invoke their constitutional right to distribute
or revise the works of others will want to use comparatively modem works.'
That reality, combined with the judicial approval of several recent statutes' 
56
that have provided for ever-increasing length of copyright protection, 11means
that "limited duration," to a far greater degree than the two internal mechanisms
already discussed, offers virtually no solace to speakers seeking greater
flexibility in using the copyrighted words of others.
In 1998, Congress passed the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA),
extending copyright for both existing and future works by an additional twenty
years. 158 In Eldred v. Ashcroft,159 the Supreme Court addressed the obverse of
the theoretical safety valve of the limited duration provision-whether this
latest extension of the term of copyright, particularly for already existing
works, 60 fell afoul of the First Amendment or the Copyright Clause.'1
6'
Eldred was a challenge to the constitutionality of the CTEA brought
by individuals and businesses who sought to use copyrighted materials to
155. Thus, the fact that a speaker may freely quote from Thomas Paine's Common
Sense or Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin is of little benefit when she really
wants to use extensive portions of Barack Obama's The Audacity of Hope.
156. See infra notes 158, 188 and accompanying text (discussing the Copyright Term
Extension Act and the Uruguay Round Agreement Act, respectively).
157. The maximum total term of copyright under the Act of 1790 was twenty-eight
years-an initial term of fourteen years, renewable for another term of fourteen years if the
author survived the first term. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003) (discussing
the nature of the 1790 copyright statute). The maximum total term was extended to forty-
two years in 1831, and to fifty-six years in 1909. See id. ("Congress expanded the federal
copyright term to 42 years in 183 1. . . ."). The 1976 Act created a term of life for the author
plus fifty years for certain works, and seventy-five years from publication for other works.
On each occasion, the statute extended the terms of both existing and future copyrights. See
id. at 194-95 (explaining the new copyright terms of the 1976 Copyright Act).
158. Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b) & (d), 112 Stat.
2827, 2827-28 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
159. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222 (finding it within the province of Congress's
discretion to extend the duration of a copyright).
160. The Court granted certiorari to consider "whether the CTEA's extension of
existing copyrights exceeds Congress' [sic] power under the Copyright Clause; and whether
the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights violates the First Amendment." Id.
at 189 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs, however, only focused on CTEA's constitutionality
with respect to existing copyrights, conceding their earlier challenges to Congress's power
with respect to protection of future works. See id at 218 n.23 ("Petitioners originally framed
this argument as implicating the CTEA's extension of both existing and future copyrights.
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create new works. The longer portion of the Court's opinion-dealing with
the Copyright Clause challenge-is not directly relevant to the issues raised
by this Article.162  The briefer portion, rejecting the plaintiffs' First
Amendment challenge,' 63 is far more instructive.
The Court's conclusion was premised on a combination of rationales.
In part, it was based on history, and the asserted compatibility of the
purposes underlying copyright's grant of limited monopolies and free
speech principles.'64 In part, it was based on the other internal limitations
just discussed above.165  In part, it was based on two very minor internal
limitations in the CTEA itself.166  And, in part, it was based on the
purported distinction between situations in which "the government compels
or burdens the communication of particular facts or ideas," 67 and situations
in which the government merely "protects authors' original expression from
unrestricted exploitation"168 by precluding unauthorized access thereto. At
the end of the day, though, these parts still do not add up to a satisfactory
resolution of the copyright-First Amendment clash.
Much has already been written-both before and after the Supreme
*Court's decision-on the inadequacy of the Court's conclusion.169  In the
162. 1d.atl199-218.
163. Id. at 218-2 1.
164. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) ("The Copyright Clause and
First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity indicates that, in the Framers'
view, copyright's limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles."); see also
supra notes 29 & 68-69 (discussing the historical background of the Copyright Clause).
165. See Eldred, 537 at 219 ("Due to this distinction, every idea, theory, and fact in a
copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation at the moment of
publication."); supra notes 75-76, 92 & 101 (explaining the limitations of copyright
protection).
166. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 220 (noting that the CTEA allows libraries to reproduce
works and exempts small businesses from paying certain performance royalties); infra note
220 (noting these two limitations).
167. Id at 221 (distinguishing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).
16 8. Id.
169. See, e.g., Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1275, 1276 (2003) ("In this Article, I wish to challenge the
constitutional dimension of the judicial rejection of the conflict argument, which concerns
the conflict between copyright law and the First Amendment."); Erwin Chemerinsky,
Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act
Is Unconstitutional, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 83, 85 (2002) ("My thesis is clearly stated:
Copyright protections are tolerated under the First Amendment because they encourage
speech. Extending copyright protections after the speech has occurred does not serve this
purpose."); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J. L. &ARTs 429, 430
(2007) ("In this Article, I argue that a similar approach [substantive and procedural
alterations] is warranted in copyright law."); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright
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interest of preserving just one more tree (or electron), suffice it to say that I
generally agree with those observations. However, the Court's casual
dismissal of First Amendment values serves as a continuing alarm for those
like me who give greater primacy to free speech concerns.
As interpreted by the Court, "limited terms" apparently only is the
opposite of "infinite protection." But, it is no bulwark against protection
that can extend for well over a century, into the lives of the grandchildren
and great-grandchildren of the creators. 7 0 Today, as a result of the CTEA,
exclusive copyright protection exists for any work created since 1923, as
long as, with respect to works created between that date and 1992, proper
and timely registration and renewal were made. 171  With the narrow
exception of certain unpublished works,17 2 not a single protected work has
entered the public domain since 1998, and not a single protected work will
enter the public domain until the end of the year 2018. 173 Since that vast
body of protected materials doubtless encompasses the overwhelming
majority of the works which would be the subject of unauthorized use17
Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN'. L. REv. 1, 69 (2001) ("First Amendment
challenges to copyright law arise in two basic contexts. The first involve facial challenges to
legislative and regulatory extensions of copyright holder rights. The second consist of First
Amendment defenses to specific applications of copyright holder rights.").
170. The term of copyright of a work created by most individual authors now consists
of "the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death." 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
With growing life expectancies, a work created by a latter-day young and healthy Mozart
could easily have copyright protection for well over 150 years.
Certain other works get protection for nearly a century, and in some cases even longer.
See id. § 302(c) ("In the case of an anonymous work, a pseudonymous work, or a work made
for hire, the copyright endures for a term of 95 years from the year of its first publication, or
a term of 120 years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first.").
171. See infra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing the 1992 statute making
renewal automatic for works created between 1964 and 1977).
172. See 17 U.S.C. § 303 (specifying the duration of copyright for works created but
not published before the effective date of the Copyright Act).
173. The ninety-five year term of a work created in 1923 will finally expire in 2018
unless Congress once again extends the duration of copyright. See id. § 305 (providing that
the term of copyright runs through the end of the calendar year in which it would otherwise
expire).
174. Because the musical works in the American Society of Composers, Authors &
Publishers (ASCAP) and the Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI) repertoires alone approach 5
million works, the corpus of protected materials doubtless runs into the tens of millions. See
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS & PUBLISHERS, www.ascap.com/about (last
visited Sept 24, 2010) (licensing and distributing royalties for performances of certain
copyrighted work) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); BROADCAST MUSIC,
INC., www.bmi.com/about (last visited Sept 24, 2010) (licensing and distributing royalties
from businesses that use music) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
865
66 7 WA SH & LEE L. REV 831 (2 010)
and for which First Amendment freedom would be sought, the promise of
only limited duration as a safety valve is wholly illusory to address this
concern.
Since Eldred was decided, two other kinds of challenges have been
mounted under the First Amendment to statutes which have altered the time
frame in which copyrighted works will fall into the public domain."' 5 One
challenge has been completely unsuccessful. 176  The other was directly
rebuffed by one court of appeals; 17in another circuit, the challenge was
initially remanded for further analysis but was ultimately rejected there as
well.17 1
The 1976 Copyright Act, as enacted, retained the system under the
1909 Act, which mandated renewal of copyrights; renewal was required for
all works that were still in their first term in 1978, which was the effective
date of the 1976 Act. 179 However, that requirement was abolished by the
Copyright Renewal Act (CRA), which made renewal automatic, for a
second term of forty-seven years.180 That was then extended to a renewal
term of sixty-seven years by the CTEA. 18 1 In the absence of this change,
unless the copyright owner had taken the affirmative step of renewal, works
created between 1964 and 1977 would have fallen into the public
domain. 12Now, copyright on these works automatically extends from
2059 to 2072.183 In Kahle v. Gonzales,8 the Ninth Circuit rejected both
First Amendment and Copyright Clause challenges to the Copyright
175. See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (identifying two challenges
mounted under the First Amendment to copyright statutes).
176. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (addressing the challenge raised in
Kahle v. Gonzales).
177. See infra notes 188-95 and accompanying text (addressing the challenge raised in
Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales).
178. See infra notes 196-208 and accompanying text (addressing the challenge raised
in Golan v. Gonzales).
179. 17 U.S.C. § 304(a) (2006). Because the initial term of copyright under the 1909
Act was twenty-eight years, that provision required renewal, in the twenty-eighth year, of
works created between 1950 and 1977.
180. Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, Title 1, § 102(a) & (d), 106
Stat. 264,264-66 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
181. See supra note 158 and accompanying text (discussing the CTEA).
182. This process was most likely to occur with respect to the large bulk of works
which had little or no commercial value.
183. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (explaining the effect of the CRA).
184. See Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 698 (9th Cir. 2007) (addressing the
petitioner's claims that alterations in the copyright system ought to require First Amendment
review), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1096 (2008).
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Renewal Act.'18' As to the former, the court found that the change from an
"lopt-in" to an "opt-out" system, resulting in the defacto extension of many
copyright terms, was "materially indistinguishable" from the CTEA
extensions upheld in Eldred. 1 16 In both situations, the Congress decided to
treat copyright for existing works and future works similarly, and the First
Amendment did not stand as an obstacle to that decision.'
The other challenge involved the URAA. By that statute, the Congress
went a step even beyond the CTEA's and CRA's extension of existing
copyright terms-it restored copyright protection to certain works which
had already fallen into the public domain.18 8  Copyrights on a number of
works of foreign holders, although still protected by the law where the work
was originally published, had fallen into the public domain in the United
States.18 9  The URAA established or reestablished copyright protection
under American law for those works.'90
Two courts of appeals have considered, and rejected, challenges to
URAA by entities that had previously used those works without
restriction.' 91 Because of the URAA, those entities, or individuals, have
now either been absolutely barred from those uses or been subjected to
licensing and the payment of royalties.192  In one case, the D.C. Circuit
limited its consideration to a challenge under the Copyright Clause.193 The
court held that this situation was also controlled by Eldred,194 concluding
185. See id. at 701 ("Both of Plaintiffs' main claims attempt to tangentially relitigate
Eldred However, they provide no compelling reason why we should depart from a recent
Supreme Court decision.').
186. Id. at 700.
187. See id. ("[E]xtending existing copyrights to achieve parity with future copyrights
does not require further First Amendment scrutiny."). The court went on to note that
"traditional First Amendment safeguards such as fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy
are sufficient to vindicate the speech interests affected by the CRA and the CTEA." Id. The
court also rejected the plaintiff's Copyright Clause claim, holding that it was disposed of by
Eldred. Id.
188. URAA, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2006).
189. This might have occurred for a variety of reasons. For example, the United States
may have failed to recognize copyrights of a particular country, or the copyright owner may
have failed to comply with formalities for American protection.
190. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the IJRAA).
19 1. See infra notes 193-208 (detailing two court opinions considering challenges to
the IJRAA).
192. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of the URAA).
193. Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262, 1262-63 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(affirming the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims that the URAA was
unconstitutional).
194. The district court had also considered a First Amendment challenge, but then had
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that there was no "material distinction. ... in terms of the language of the
Copyright and Patent Clause or the proper roles of Congress and the
judiciary. .. " 9 '
In the other case, the Tenth Circuit also rejected a Copyright Clause
challenge to the URAA, but remanded the plaintiffs' attack based on the
First Amendment in its first analysis of the issue. 196 The court's analysis
began by asking whether the URAA had "altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection."' 9 ' Unlike the extension of copyright terms for
existing copyrights, which had occurred on multiple occasions in the past,
here the statute took the highly unusual step of removing works from the
public domain.198 And that alteration of the "traditional contours affected
the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests," since that provision protects
their right to unrestrained use of those works.199 "By removing works from
the public domain, [the IJRAA] arguably hampers free expression and
undermines the values the public domain is designed to protect.' 200 Finally,
dismissed that as well. See Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107,
119 (D.D.C. 2004) ("When Congress 'has not altered the traditional contours of copyright
protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary. . . ."' (quoting Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003))). Furthermore, the court concluded that the URAA
"does not encroach on the traditional copyright protections and includes additional
protections .. ... ' Id.
195. Luck's, 407 F.3d at 1265. "Plaintiffs completely fail to adduce any substantive
distinction between the imbalance (if it be that) in tacking 20 years onto a copyright term
about to expire in (say) a year, and extending protection to material that has fallen into the
public domain." Id.
196. See Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The clear import
of Eldred is that Congress has expansive powers when it legislates under the Copyright
Clause, and this court may not interfere so long as Congress has rationally exercised is
authority."), modifiedon other grounds, Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010).
197. Id The significance of this test for possible First Amendment scrutiny of
copyright legislation is discussed infra notes 253-66 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the URAA). The court
stated that it was a "bedrock principle of copyright law that works in the public domain
remain there," and concluded that the UTRAA "alters the traditional contours of copyright
protection by deviating from this principle." Golan, 501 F.3d at 1187-88.
The IJRAA deviated from the standard progression-from creation to copyright to the
public domain-because under the Act, "the copyright sequence no longer necessarily ends
with the public domain; indeed, it may begin there." Id. at 1189. Unlike the prior statutory
extensions of pre-existing works referenced in Eldred, there was only a very limited history,
involving exceptional situations, of extricating works from the public domain. See id. at
1190 ("The significance of the copyright sequence, combined with the principle that no
individual may copyright a work in the public domain, is that ordinarily works in the public
domain stay there.").
199. Golan, 501 F.3d at 1192.
200. Idat 1194.
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the court concluded that the two traditional internal mechanisms for
reconciling copyright and the First Amendment-the idea-expression
dichotomy and the fair use doctrine-did not adequately serve to protect
speech interests. 0
The Tenth Circuit, however, did not find the URAA to be
unconstitutional, but only concluded that its "interference with plaintiffs'
rights [was] subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 20 2 Therefore, it remanded
the plaintiffs' challenge to the district court, to determine, among other
questions, whether the URAA was content-based or content-neutral. 
203
On remand, the court initially noted that the parties agreed that the
IJRAA restraints were content-neutral, and it accepted that assessment.2
The court then found that the restoration of rights to works that previously
were in the public domain, which was effected by the URAA, was
unconstitutional .205 The statute significantly burdened the plaintiffs' speech
interests, and the statute did not advance significant government interests by
abridging those rights.20
On its second consideration of this constitutional challenge, the Tenth
Circuit reversed, upholding the URAA against all challenges .20 ' Applying
the two prongs of the intermediate scrutiny test,208 the court of appeals found
that the statute advanced important government interests unrelated to the
suppression of free speech, and that it did not burden substantially more
speech than was necessary to further those interests.
201. Id. at 1194-95.
202. Id. at 1194.
203. Id. at 1196-97. The significance of this determination is that content-neutral
restraints are subject to intermediate scrutiny. The different tests used to evaluate content-
based and content-neutral restraints are discussed infra notes 267-72 and accompanying
text.
204. See Golan v. Holder, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (D. Colo. 2009) ("[T]he speech
restricted is a general category of speech-namely, speech created by foreign authors."),
rev'd, 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010).
205. See id at 1177 ("Accordingly-to the extent [the URAA] suppresses the right of
reliance parties to use works they exploited while the works were in the public domain-[the
URAA] is substantially broader than necessary to achieve the Government's interest.").
206. Id. at 1172-77. The three interests proffered by the government, but which were
found inadequate by the court to justify the abridgement wrought by URAA, were (1) the
desire to bring the United States into substantial compliance with its treaty obligations under
the Berne Convention, (2) protection of copyright interests of U.S. authors in other
countries, and (3) correction of "historical inequities" suffered by foreign authors under
American law. See id (outlining and analyzing the government's proffered interests).
207. Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076, 1095 (10th Cit. 2010).
208. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing the intermediate scrutiny
test).
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Two conclusions can be drawn from the various statutory provisions
setting forth the terms of a copyright 20 9 and from Eldred and these
subsequent cases addressing challenges to amendments to those provisions.
It is clear that the "limited duration" requirement grounded in Article I does
not serve as a significant internal safeguard for First Amendment concerns.
To the contrary, the relative indifference of these courts to those concerns,
and their willingness to defer to Congressional judgments about the
appropriate scope of copyright protection, indicates that other means must be
found to deal with the occasional First Amendment clashes.
d Merger Doctrine and Scenes A Faire
As noted above, one potential reconciliation of the First Amendment
and copyright is the principle that the latter only protects expression, and that
210others remain free to express the underlying idea in other ways. Under the
merger doctrine, copyright protection will be withheld even from a work's
original expression, if the work's underlying idea can be effectively
expressed only one way.211I The related scenes 6faire doctrine provides that
copyright protection may be withheld from certain elements of a work which
are "pre-ordained" by the work's unprotectable ideas; examples of this are
certain basic plot or character qualities, which would typically be found in
any work of that type.21 The merger doctrine has most frequently been used
to withhold protection for functional and factual works, while the scenesa
faire doctrine more frequently arises to limit protection for fictional works. 1
It is initially noteworthy that 'these doctrines are invoked far less
frequently than the first two internal mechanisms already discussed. In any
event, the objections to concluding that the idea-expression dichotomy and
the fair use doctrine fully address First Amendment concerns 214 also apply to
209. 17 U.s.c. §§ 302-05 (2006).
210. See supra Part IJI.B.2.a (discussing the general rule that copyright only protects
specific expression).
211. See generally 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.3.2 (3d ed. Supp.
2009) (explaining the merger doctrine of copyrighxt law).
212. See id. § 2.3.2.2 (explaining the scenes ii faire doctrine and the idea of "pre-
ordained" elements).
213. Id
214. See supra notes 79-91 & 107-33 and accompanying text (explaining various
reasons why the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine are not sufficient
safeguards for the First Amendment).
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merger and scenes 6 faire."'5 The scope of these doctrines suffers from
similar imprecision, once again giving rise to a chilling effect on potentially
lawful speech. More importantly, as discussed more fully below, the need to
use copyrighted expression is not usually the product of the inability to
describe the expression in another way; rather, it is the product of the fact that
in certain situations, those alternatives are simply not adequate substitutes,
and that the robustness of dialogue contemplated by the First Amendment
may indicate the imperative for using that particular form of protected
216expression.
e. Other Internal Mechanisms
Arguably, some of the other limitations on copyrightability or on the
rights and remedies of copyright owners may serve to address First
Amendment concerns. These limitations include the requirement of
originality as a condition for obtaining copyright protection; 217 the first sale
doctrine;218 the limitation on the performance right to public performances;
219
and a host of other statutory exceptions, exemptions and compulsory
licenses .220  While these limitations may affect the copyright-First
215. Cf N.Y. Mercantile Exch. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 116-18
(2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting a challenge by a commodities futures exchange to a competitor's
use of settlement prices that were determined on a daily basis by exchange members), cert.
denied, 552 U.S. 1259 (2008). The court determined that even if prices were sufficiently
creative and original to warrant copyright protection-an issue on which the majority
expressed doubt-protection for the idea of determining those prices was precluded by the
merger doctrine; the court did not discuss First Amendment interests in the free
dissemination of that information. Id.
216. See infra Part III.C.2.b.(2) (discussing situations in which there is a compelling
First Amendment reason for using the protected speech, including situations in which
paraphrasing the copyrighted work would not serve the same purpose).
217. Cf Feist Publ'ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1991) ("The
sine qua non of copyright is originality .... Originality is a constitutional requirement.").
218. See 17 U. S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (permitting the owner of a particular copy of a work
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy).
219. See id. § 106(4) (granting the copyright owner an exclusive right to perform the
copyrighted work publicly).
220. See id. §§ 108-21 (providing various statutory limitations on the exclusive rights
granted by § 106). In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), the Court identified two
aspects of the CTEA which "supplements. ... traditional First Amendment safeguards." Id.
at 220. These were the exception in 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) for libraries and archives to
reproduce certain works during the last 20 years of the copyright term, and the provision in
§ 110O(5)(B) expanding the exemption for small businesses and restaurants from having to
pay royalties for the performance of music from broadcast sources. Id. If these really are
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Amendment clash at the margins, they also fail to address the bulk of the
concerns raised by the sometimes inconsistent interests embodied in the two
regimes.
C Sometimes First Amendment Interests Trump
Even though my default position in the event of a clash is to tip the
balance towards greater protection of free speech, and thus to an expansion of
the unconstrained right to reproduce and distribute copyrighted material, I
recognize that the First Amendment does not provide unlimited rights to use
those materials.221' Admittedly, merely waving a constitutional flag should
not be enough. Thus, I find intellectual allies with other commentators who
would expand the reach of the First Amendment in dealing with copyright
claims, but who also recognize the limits on that defense. 2
Although the potential clash between these two regimes is not merely a
"tempest in a teapot," it is true that the worst fears of champions of First
Amendment values have not been realized. In the majority of cases asserting
free speech defenses, copyright claims have yielded based on one of the
"internal mechanisms," and so First Amendment concerns have been
satisfied, even if they were not addressed directly.22 This is a desirable
outcome. There is a preference for avoiding constitutional issues, if matters
can be resolved on the basis of statutory interpretation2 2
supplements, their First Amendment impact is minimal at best.
221. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184,
1188 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized
rights in intellectual property."); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc.,
75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D. Utah 1999) ("[Mihe First Amendment does not give
defendants the right to infr-inge on legally recognized rights under the copyright law."). But
see Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE
L.J. 1, 24-30 (2002) (rejecting a claim that copyright is immune from a First Amendment
challenge because it is a form of property).
222. See, e.g., Alan E. Garfield, The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright
Law, 35 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1169, 1172 (2007) ("Scholars may have undermined their own
cause by exaggerating the threat of overbearing copyright owners and by casting their
arguments in theoretical terms that have left judges with little practical guidance.").
223. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir.
2003) (affirming the dismissal of a challenge to a parody because it was shielded by the fair
use doctrine, while noting that the "[defendant] has created the sort of social criticism and
parodic speech protected by the First Amendment and promoted by the Copyright Act");
infra notes 279, 330 and accompanying text (discussing Mattel).
224. A passage from Justice Brandeis's 6oncurring decision in Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), is often cited in connection with the doctrine of
"constitutional avoidance": "The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
872
COPYRIGHT AND THE FIRST AM ENDMENT87
1. There Really Is a Problem
Courts, however, have not always gotten it right. To the contrary, as
discussed below, there are a number of cases in which courts improperly
rejected arguments that the First Amendment shielded the defendants'
conduct from claims of copyright infringement. 2 More significantly, the
uncertainty as to whether particular unauthorized uses of copyrighted
materials would be shielded by the First Amendment and the costs and risks
of litigation doubtless have led, and will continue to lead, many speakers to
desist from conduct which might have been determined, by at least some
courts, to be perfectly lawful.
Indeed, the cases in which, in my view, the courts have gotten it wrong
are likely only the tip of the iceberg. It is the self-censoring effect of under-
protection for the First Amendment which is probably the far more
significant concern. 2 Here, like the famous canine identified by Sherlock
Holmes, our concern is for the "dog that didn't bark.",2 1 Unfortunately, the
result of present-day doctrine is that our political, social and cultural
properly presented by the record, if there is also some ground upon which the case may be
disposed of. "Id. at 347. "[I]f a case can he decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter." Id.; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1811 (2009) ("The so-called canon of constitutional avoidance is an
interpretive tool, counseling that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious
constitutional debate."); Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 550 U.S. 511, 514 (2007)
(noting the "established practice of interpreting statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties").
225. See, e.g., infra note 236 and accompanying text (identifying some cases in which
the court rejected a First Amendment defense).
226. In Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), the Court identified concern for self-
censorship as a basis for striking down a Los Angeles city ordinance which imposed strict
criminal liability-irrespective of scienter--on retailers possessing or selling obscene
materials. Id. at 2 19-20. It noted that the booksellers' alternative, which would likely have
resulted in the removal of nonobscene as well as obscene materials from their shelves, would
have harmed the public as much as the sellers themselves:
For if the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, and
the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict the books he sells to
those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a restriction upon
the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature...
The bookseller's self-censorship, compelled by the State, would be a censorship
affecting the whole public ....
Id. at 153-54 (footnotes omitted). See also McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 685
(1976) (asserting that "the possible erroneous imposition of civil sanctions under the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard simply creates too great a risk of self-censorship").
227. See ARTHuR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze (1892), in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK
HOLMES 33 5, 347 (Barnes & Noble, Inc. 1992).
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dialogues have become less robust than the First Amendment would
sanction.22 Therefore, continued attention to achieving the proper balance
continues to be necessary.
There are several reasons that First Amendment interests are under-
protected. To begin with, as discussed above, 2 the various proffered
internal mechanisms have not proven adequate for full vindication of First
Amendment values.23 Second, as just noted, because of the uncertainty
regarding their reach, parties cannot know ex ante the extent of the
accommodation that will be afforded to First Amendment goals, and so they
may simply desist from taking the chance of liability for copyright
infringement.23 In those cases in which parties have taken that risk,
sometimes First Amendment values have taken a back-seat, because courts
have given an unduly restrictive reading to these internal mechanisms. 
232
Also, one cannot take complete satisfaction even from some of the decisions
where the First Amendment ultimately prevailed, because there the courts
may have given what many commentators might view as an inaccurately
expansive treatment to those safety valves.
The inability of the internal mechanisms fully to address First
Amendment concerns is best demonstrated by an examination of some
illustrative cases. Several of these cases have already been discussed ;
233
others are discussed in the following portion of this Article. 3 In general,
however, they fall into two categories. In one-which includes the cases
already discussed-plaintiffs have asserted facial challenges to statutes
expanding the scope of copyright protection, and they have argued, in part,
that the expansion is inconsistent with the First Amendment .23 ' The other
228. See James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, 63
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 341 (2000) ("[Cloncern for First Amendment values seems
entirely over-shadowed by a commitment to intellectual property maximalism.").
229. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the various internal mechanisms of the copyright
system for dealing with First Amendment concerns).
230. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 252-53 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(providing examples of situations where neither idea-expression restriction nor fair use
exception would adequately protect First Amendment interests).
23 1. See supra notes 82, 108, 153 and accompanying text (discussing the chilling effect
of the threat of litigation).
232. See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 252-53 (Breyer, 3., dissenting) (criticizing the "'First
Amendment safeguards' in which the majority places its trust").
233. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text (discussing Harper & Row); notes
159-68 and accompanying text (discussing Eldred).
234. See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing cases that may be helpful in crafting a solution).
235. See supra Part III.B.2.c (discussing challenges to copyright statutes for violating
the "limited duration" requirement of the Constitution).
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category, which involves "as applied" challenges, presents even more
problematic issues. Here, the defendant may have had a First Amendment
defense to claims of copyright infringement; in most of these cases, the court
found for the plaintiff, usually after concluding that the fair use defense was
inapplicable. 3 This second, more traditional, category is likely to be more
helpful in identify'ing the appropriate reconciliation of the copyright regime
and the First Amendment, by pointing towards some defining principles.
My claim for an expansion of the rights of speakers to make greater
unconstrained use of copyrighted materials flows from the assertion that it is
simply not true, as some courts have suggested, that the First Amendment is
"inapplicable" to copyright disputes. 3 To the contrary, there are
constitutional grounds for acknowledging limits on the scope of the copyright
laws.23
8
One basis for recognizing First Amendment-derived limitations is the
fact that copyright protection is neither absolute nor self-enforcing. Unlike
the First Amendment, which, standing by itself restricts the ability of the
government to limit speech, the Copyright Clause does not confer any rights
on authors. istead, it merely creates a reservoir of congressional power, to
enact certain legislation .23 9  First, the existence and scope of any rights
conferred are the product of whatever statutes Congress has passed; those
statutes, in turn, contain limitations on those rights (including compulsory
236. See, e.g., infra notes 311-17 and accompanying text (discussing Los Angeles News
Service v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc.); notes 325-31 and accompanying text (discussing Dr.
Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc.); notes 331, 402 and accompanying text
(discussing Wait Disney Productions v. Air Pirates); notes 359-67 and accompanying text
(discussing New Era Publications International v. Henry Holt & Co.).
237. See, e.g., Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("[C]opyrights are
categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment."), questioned on this
point, aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003);
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) ('he First
Amendment adds nothing to the fair use defense. The defense .. , is the point of balance
between the right to criticize.... one aspect of freedom of expression, and the incentive to
create expressive works, . . . another aspect of the same freedom, the aspect that undergirds
the Constitution's copyright clause."); Roy Export Co. Establishment of Vaduz v. Columbia
Broad. Sys., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982) ("No Circuit that has considered the
question, however, has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the
copyright field distinct from the accommodation embodied in the 'fair use' doctrine."
(footnote omnitted)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
238. See generally William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What The First Amendment
Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits: A Summary Explanation and Review, 66
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 238 (2003) (rejecting the claim that the Copyright Clause
"'excepts' a certain area of legislation from the First Amendment").
239. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, ci. 8 (granting Congressional power rather than
mandating Congressional action).
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licenses).24 Second, the statutory regime also reflects the many rights that
Congress could have granted but has in fact withheld .24 ' Third, copyright
legislation is bounded by the purposes and limitations embodied in the
Copyright Clause. 4 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, an implicit
constraint on the power granted by that Clause is the limitations found
elsewhere in the Constitution-including, of course, the First Amendment.
Also, in deciding what rights and remedies to confer and what to withhold
pursuant to its Copyright Clause powers, one would expect that Congress has
indeed been mindful, or at least should have been mindful, of these
limitations imposed by, and values reflected by, the entire Constitution, and it
should be the duty of the courts to police those limitations.
Because of the importance that First Amendment values play in
reconciling the competing interests of copyright owners and persons seeking
broad rights to use copyrighted works, and because of the primacy that
frequently should be given to the latter interest, two steps must be taken.
First, courts must give more robust application to the internal mechanisms
discussed above. Second, because that step is unlikely to be completely
adequate to address those concerns, I argue that some additional external
mechanisms are required to ensure that First Amendment values are properly
safeguarded. 4
The need to address these First Amendment concerns has grown over
the three-plus decades since the passage of the Copyright Act. First,
regardless of what one thinks about "propertization" of copyright, 2"4 or about
240. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108-21 (2006) (providing various statutory limitations on a
copyright owner's rights, including compulsory licensing).
24 1. See, e.g., id § 106 (providing specific, delimited rights of the copyright owner).
242. Cf Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-205 (recognizing that Congress's authority to pass
Copyright legislation is rooted in the Copyright Clause).
243. Cf Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1200 (N.D. Cal.
2004) ('Copyright protection sometimes appears to conflict with First Amendment
protections. This conflict is ameliorated in part by various copyright doctrines." (emphasis
added)).
244. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Deprivatizing Copyright, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387,
390 (2003) (arguing that "the time has come to recognize both copyright law as a form of
privatization and the need to deprivatize copyright in order to realize the public good that
Madison envisioned"); Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1535 (1993)
(arguing "that a properly conceived natural-rights theory of intellectual property would
provide significant protection for free speech interests"); Randal Picker, From Edison to the
Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refiisal and the Propertization of Copyright,
70 U. Cm. L. Rev. 281 (2003) (arguing that modem technologies for controlling access to
copyrighted material have given copyright owners a greater degree of control akin to more
traditional property); Stacy McDonald, Comment, Copyright for Sale: How the
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the best balance of the interests of copyright owners, users of copyrighted
materials, and persons seeking to create new works, there is no arguing that
there have been significant changes in several aspects of copyright. This
includes growth in the kinds of works for which copyright is available;
45
expansion of the rights of copyright owners and the remedies available
against infringers; 246 extension of the duration of copyrght;24 ' and the
creation of a variety of para-copyrights, granted most notably, but not
exclusively, by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.24
Commodification of Intellectual Property Distorts the Social Bargain Implicit in the
Copyright Clause, 50 How. L.J. 541, 544 (2007) (arguing "that the commodification of
intellectual property distorts the copyright balance by valuing a copyrighted work for its
market potential over, above, and to the exclusion of its non-economic values").
245. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (affording, for the first time, statutory protection
for pantomimes and choreographic works); id. § 102(a)(7) (affording protection for sound
recordings, first protected by a 1971 amendment to the 1909 Act); id. § 1 02(a)(8) (adding,
effective in 1990, protection for architectural works).
246. See, e.g., Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damnages Improvement Act of
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774, 1774 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§ 504(c)) (increasing statutory damages by fifty percent); Digital Performance Right in
Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 2, 109 Stat. 336, 336 (codified at 17
U.S.C. § 106(6)) (adding a section conferring the right to perform sound recordings by
means of digital audio transmissions).
247. See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998) (extending the copyright term of the 1976 Act for an additional 20 years);
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (setting the copyright term at the
life of the author plus fifty years, or seventy-five years for anonymous or pseudonymous
works, or works made for hire); Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075
(setting the copyright term at twenty-eight years, with the possibility of an additional
renewal term of twenty-eight years); Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat. 436 (setting the
copyright term at twenty-eight years, with the possibility of an additional renewal term of 14
years); Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (setting the copyright term at fourteen years, with
the possibility of an additional renewal term of fourteen years); supra note 157 and
accompanying text (discussing the repeated Congressional extension of copyright terms).
248. See DMCA, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-05) (prohibiting both actual circumvention of technology controlling access to
copyrighted materials, and manufacture and sale of certain devices which permit
circumvention of technological controls over access to or use of such materials); Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 323, 323-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
fair use defense is unavailable for violations of DMCA), aff'd sub nom. Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); supra note 153 (discussing Reimerdes);
see also Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1199 n.14 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) ("[L]eav[ing] open the question as to when § 107 might serve as an affirmative
defense to a prima facie violation of § 1201 [of the DMCA].").
Other statutes which afford para-copyright protection include the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14)
(providing protection against unauthorized copying for semiconductor chips and "mask
works"); the Audio Home Recording Act, 102 Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992)
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Second, the ease with which copyrighted materials can be reproduced
and the range with which they can be distributed has grown significantly
since 1976. A few years ago, a new buzzword was "desktop publishing."
Now, even that phrase is somewhat pass6. Today, with a computer, anyone
can make a perfect copy of literary and musical works, whether for personal
or commercial purposes. Then, using that same computer and an internet
connection, that person can send those copies virtually instantaneously to
millions of people around the world, and at minimal expense for
249
reproduction and distribution.
The various expansions of copyright protection just noted are among
the methods by which the owners of copyright interests have attempted to
respond to these developments .25 0 However, the opportunities afforded by
these technological developments have also expanded the importance to
speakers of being able to reproduce, distribute, alter or comment on the
expressive elements of certain copyrighted materials, without first obtaining
permission from the copyright owner .25 1 The failure to adjust copyright and
First Amendment jurisprudence to meet these needs has led to under-
protection of free speech interests.
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10) (authorizing copying controls on, and providing a
royalty payment system for, digital audio recording devices); URAA, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
§§ 512-13, 108 Stat. 4809, 4974-76 (1994) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1101 & 18 U.S.C.
§ 23 19A) (creating an "anti-bootlegging" provision by providing civil relief and criminal
penalties for unauthorized fixation, transmission, or distribution of live musical
performances).
249. Many twenty-first century uses of digital technology and the Internet raise
questions about the rationale underlying copyright protection, such as the continuing
necessity for long-term, exclusive protection for works in order to incentivize their creation.
Whether it is the proliferation of blogs, Facebook pages, or YouTube postings, millions of
individuals seem perfectly happy to disseminate their creations without any regard to
whether others will seek permission to reproduce or redistribute those works, much less
make payment for those uses.
250. See McKenna, supra note 1 11, at 22 (noting that digital technologies not only
make dissemination of copyrighted materials easier, but also increase likelihood of
challenges because uses are more visible to copyright owners).
251. The correlative to this explosion of sources of creative works and vehicles for their
distribution is an erosion of the preeminence of the traditional sources of copyrighted work.
As suggested in supra note 249, newspapers and magazines have been supplemented by
blogs; radio and television have been supplemented by the posting of material to YouTube;
and mass-produced sound recordings and videos have been supplemented by people making
and distributing individual copies of CDs and DVDs. And, more and more, people are
relying on these alternative sources for information and entertainment. If they are to be
encouraged and nurtured, individuals will often need more flexibility in being able to use
preexisting, and frequently copyrighted, materials. See Boyle, supra note 228, at 349-50
(arguing for heightened attention to First Amendment values in online settings).
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2. Seeking a Solution
So, finally, for the hard part: What is the solution? Are there tests,
standards, approaches, or methodologies, that courts could use to reconcile
these values?
a. General Principles
While not identifying precisely when copyright might have to yield,
the Supreme Court in Eldred offered one possibility. The Court stated that
the D.C. Circuit had "spokein] too broadly when it declared copyrights
'categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment." 2 52
However, the Court stated that "copyright's built-in free speech safeguards
are generally adequate to address [First Amendment concerns]. 5  That
assertion obviously leaves unstated when those safeguards might prove
inadequate.
A hint of the opening contemplated by the Court might have been
provided by the concluding sentence in that portion of the opinion: "But
when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of
copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.1
25 4
While the meaning of this statement is unclear, it carries the problematic
implication that the courts should defer to congressional judgments with
respect to any statutory provisions, or subsequent amendment, that fall
within these contours.
As discussed above, 5 several courts have used this highlighted
language as a benchmark for determining whether a copyright statute may
have run afoul of First Amendment limitations. 5 While this possible
exception may be useful in beginning the analysis, I believe that it seriously
understates the situations in which the First Amendment should prevail.
One problem with the statement of this "exception" is that the Court
provided no guidance on the meaning of "traditional contours." Was this
252. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d
372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
253. Id. (emphasis added).
254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. See supra notes 194 & 197-99 and accompanying text (discussing cases that have
applied the First Amendment language of Eldred).
256. See, e.g., Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting the
highlighted Eldred language); Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 2007) (same);
Luck's Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 321 F. Supp. 2d 107, 119 (D.D.C. 2004) (same).
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formulation simply a way of restating the idea-expression and fair use
limitations on copyright protection? If so, it adds very little. Or, was there
perhaps a suggestion that it referred to long-standing, but changeable,
characteristics of copyright, and that the effects of such changes would be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny?
If the answer to this latter question is "yes," considerable difficulty
would arise by trying to ascertain what is meant by "traditional." For
example, for the first eight decades of copyright legislation, there was no
protection for derivative works, 5 the category that creates the greatest
problems for potential First Amendment clashes. 5 It was not until 1870
that protection was first extended to the "right to dramatize or translate, 2 19
and broader rights to control transformations, although still falling short of
the right to prepare a derivative work conferred by the Copyright Act of
1976260 were not extended until 1909.261 Yet, it is doubtful that the Court
intended to open up First Amendment scrutiny for all derivative works.
Or, is this "exception" limited to more recent changes-for example,
the doctrine that prevailed until 1978, that unpublished works were
protected by state common law copyright rather than under federal law,26
or that until 1989, certain formalities, including placement of notice, were
required to claim copyright protection? 263  The recent creation of various
para-copyrights264 might be such an alteration. But, again, the Court's
statement raises more questions than it provides answers.
Regardless of its meaning, the Court's reference to "traditional
contours" takes too cramped an approach to accommodating First
257. See, e.g., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa 1853) (denying Harriet
Beecher Stowe relief against an unauthorized translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin).
258. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations imposed
on First Amendment freedom by copyright's protection of derivative works).
259. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
260. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
261. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 1(b), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76
(affording to copyright owners, with respect to various types of works, the right to translate,
dramatize, convert, arrange, adapt, complete, execute and finish the work).
262. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (preempting protection inconsistent with the federal regime,
and abolishing common law copyright); see supra note 38 and accompanying text
(discussing the § 301 (a) treatment of state common law copyright).
263. See Berne Implementation Amendments, Pub. L. No. 100-568, § 12, 102 Stat.
2853, 2860 (1988) (eliminating, as of Mar. 1, 1989, notice as a condition for obtaining
copyright protection).
264. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing the DMCA and other acts
that create "para-copyrights").
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Amendment interests to the copyright laws.26 It suggests far too great a
deference to Congress in weighing important constitutional values,
something that the Court has been quite unwilling to do in a host of other
settings.26 Furthermore, clashes of those values can, and do, occur even
within those "traditional contours." Thus, to resolve those clashes, I
suggest looking not only to the goals of these two regimes, but also to ways
in which core principles from First Amendment case law can form the
underpinnings of my proposed methodology.
First, a very brief (and admittedly very incomplete) review of First
Amendment jurisprudence follows. 267  In defining the extent to which the
government is prevented from limiting speech, 6 one step often taken in
interpreting that provision is to distinguish between content-based and
content-neutral restraints 269 For the former, courts use a "strict scrutiny"
test, striking down the restraint unless the defendant meets the heavy
burden of showing that the restriction is narrowly tailored to meet a
265. See generally Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, The First Amendment, and Aggressive
Copyright Claims, 40 Hous. L. R~v. 673 (2003) (noting the recent reliance by political
candidates on copyright law to attack rivals' political speech, and expressing hope that
Eldred's signal-that courts should not ignore First Amendment concerns-may become a
basis for rebutting these aggressive claims).
266. For the most recent, and controversial, of many possible examples, see Citizens
United v. Fed Elections Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010), in which the Court struck
down portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 as inconsistent with
protections afforded to corporations and labor unions by the First Amendment.
267. The Supreme Court has addressed the First Amendment in hundreds of decisions,
addressing a multiplicity of factual situations. These include the kind of speech (political,
obscene, defamatory, symbolic, etc.), the place (public streets, private property, schools, in a
newspaper, etc.), the type of restriction imposed (prior restraint, post-conduct imprisonment,
civil damages, etc.), and many other variations. What follows is obviously just the barest of
bones of the tests used.
268. As noted earlier, this may include private parties using the courts in an attempt to
limit the speech of others. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (acknowledging that the
immediate cause of almost all specific restrictions of speech involve a private actor filing a
suit).
269. There is extensive commentary in the literature as to the nature of copyright
restrictions, and on which side of this divide they fall. That debate is beyond the scope of
this Article.
As noted above, in Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179 (10Oth Cir. 2007), in considering a
First Amendment challenge to the URAA, the Tenth Circuit thought it important to decide
whether the challenged copyright restorations were content-neutral or content-based. Id. at
1196-97; supra notes 196-208 and accompanying text. Regardless of the relevance of this
distinction to such a facial challenge to a statute, it has less importance in deciding whether
an individual defendant can rely on the First Amendment to defend a particular use against
claims of copyright infringement.
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compelling public interest. 27 0 For the latter, courts use a more deferential
standard, sometimes referred to as "intermediate scrutiny.",2 7'1 This kind of
restraint will be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governental interest unrelated to the suppression of speech, if it is
reasonable with respect to time, place and manner, and if ample alternative
channels of communication have been left open. 7 I do not find it
necessary to resolve any dispute as to the characterization of copyright's
regulation of speech, though I recognize that those in the "content-based"
camp have even stronger claims for extending First Amendment protection
to copyright infringement defendants. 7 Rather, the approach that I suggest
for reconciling the First Amendment-copyright clash draws on elements of
the tests used for both of these kinds of restraints, and in many ways is the
mirror of the limitations imposed on a variety of speech restrictions.
270. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132 (2009)
("[A]ny restriction based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is, the
restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. .. .)
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098 (2009) ("Restrictions on speech
based on its content are 'presumptively invalid' and subject to strict scrutiny.'); United
States v. Playboy Enter. Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("Since § 505 is content based, it
can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny.. .. It must be narrowly tailored to promote a
compelling Government interest, and if a less restrictive alternative would serve the
Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative." (citations omitted)).
271. See, e.g., Ysursa, 129 S. Ct. at 1103 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing "what the
Court sometimes calls an 'intermediate scrutiny"').
272. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)
("Expression . .. is subject to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions ... ).
"[R]estrictions of this kind are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."). Id; see also Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S.
316, 322-23 (2002) (considering time, place, and manner restrictions in the context of public
demonstrations in municipal parks); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) ("[T]he government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner
of protected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest, and .. , they leave open ample alternative channels for communication.. .. '
(quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293)); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47
(1986) ("[S]o-called 'content-neutral' time, place, and manner regulations are acceptable so
long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and do not
unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication.").
273. Compare Baker, supra note 6, at 922 ("[Cjopyright laws involve content-based
suppression of speech in the simplest and most direct sense.") and Rubenfeld, supra note
221, at 5 ("[Cjopyright law is clearly content-based in at least some of its applications.")
with Netanel, supra note 83, at 47-54 (concluding that copyright is content-neutral speech
regulation, which "should be subject to heightened, but not strict, scrutiny").
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In summary, I would propose that in weighing claims to copyright
exclusivity, First Amendment interests should prevail when there is a strong
public interest in allowing the unauthorized use of the protectable
expression; when the speaker has a compelling need to use the expression
itself, i.e., when paraphrasing, or describing, or summarizing the work is
simply inadequate to meet the speaker's needs; and when there are no
reasonable alternatives available to obtain consent to that use. And,
because of the importance I give to First Amendment values, I would place
the burden of proof on the copyright owner to show that these criteria were
not satisfied. 7
I recognize both that the asserted need for greater protection for First
Amendment interests is controversial 2 7 ' and that my proffered formulation
of occasions on which free speech concerns should displace of copyright
protection is imprecise. Admittedly, it suffers from much the same
unpredictability and unevenness in application that I decried with respect to
the internal safeguards. To that extent, my concern for a chilling effect may
be diminished, but it is not eliminated. However, the statement at least has
the virtue of reiterating the occasional primacy of the First Amendment and
continuing the dialogue-both academic and judicial-of the appropriate
balance between the conflicting interests. One might expect that just as
case law has given greater content to the imprecision of the fair use
doctrine, judicial application of an approach like mine will concretize those
standards.
b. Identifying Criteria to Implement These Principles
(1) The Public Interest
The key consideration for identifying situations in which First
Amendment values would prevail over copyright claims is the existence of
a public interest in allowing unfettered use of the copyrighted work. The
nature of that interest is two-fold: the value to the speaker in being able to
274. See supra notes 130-31 & 151 and accompanying text (arguing for a rule that the
plaintiff should have the burden of proof to show that First Amendment interests are not
abridged).
275. See, e.g., Lackland Bloom, Copyright Under Siege: The First Amendment Front,
9 Comp. L. REV. & TECH J. 41, 42 (2004) (describing Eldreds "resounding rejection of
practically all of the modem first amendment-based copyright challenges" as "correct,
sensible and persuasive," and concluding that internal mechanisms adequately address
virtually all free speech concerns).
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disseminate, and perhaps to comment on or criticize, the protected
expression, and the value to society in hearing or seeing that speech. 7
Both of these concerns inform an assessment of the nature and degree of
this public interest. In addition, the importance to the speaker of using this
particular protected expression is also relevant to my proposed second
factor-the asserted need for that use.
The description of copyright as one of the branches of intellectual
property offers support for certain public interest-based limitations on the
rights of the copyright owner. The law regarding tangible property is
replete with examples of limitations on the property owner. He may not
engage in conduct which constitutes a nuisance. She may be subject to
zoning restrictions. He may be required to permit public access or grant
easements to the property. She may not place certain encumbrances on
subsequent transfer or alienation of the property, and so on. Similarly,
ownership of a copyright does not automatically entitle the owner to
unlimited and unrestricted rights. In addition to the limitations in the
statute itself, the First Amendment may serve as a basis for permitting
increased access to certain expression, to the extent that there is a "public
interest" in further limitations on the copyright owner's rights. 7
The existence and nature of a public interest in fostering expanded
dissemination of copyrightable expression will depend in part on its subject
matter. It is particularly important to permit unauthorized, as well as
276. In our ever-expanding global world, speech uttered in this counitry is increasingly
heard around the world, It is true that persons outside the United States may not have the
same First Amendment claims for being deprived of the opportunity to hear speech whose
utterance was foreclosed in the United States, as would persons within the United States who
lost that opportunity. However, First Amendment interests are still implicated by that loss.
In addition to the externality of a benefit flowing to foreign audiences from expanded
protection for such speech, there is enhanced value for domestic speakers in having access to
an international audience.
277. The question of whether particular speech is of public concern already is a part of
First Amendment jurisprudence. For example, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767 (1986), a private figure brought a libel action against a newspaper based on
several articles which suggested that he had connections to organized crime. Id. at 770-7 1.
At issue was which party had the burden of showing that the statements at issue were false.
Id. at 776. The Court identified "two forces that may reshape the common-law landscape to
conform to the First Amendment." Id. at 775. One was whether the plaintiff was a public
official or a private figure. Id. "The second is whether the speech at issue is of public
concern." Id; see also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
758-59 (1985) (noting that speech on "matters of public concern" is "at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection" (citations omitted)).
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permitted, uses of the original expression with respect to topics of
discussion and controversy in the public arena.27
However, in determining whether there is a strong public interest in
permitting such unauthorized uses, it is important not to over-emphasize the
newsworthy quality of the use. It is true that the value to society may
arguably be greater when the expression concerns political, social or
economic issues, and so perhaps there should be a stronger presumption
that unauthorized uses of those kinds of expressions are consistent with the
public interest. But, because there often will also be important values in
allowing greater access to expression which is more of a cultural, artistic or
entertainment nature, 7 the public interest in the expanded and
unconstrained dissemination of those kinds of works should not be
understated. 8
(2) Compelling Need to Use the Protected Expression
Although the public interest in allowing unconstrained dissemination
would be the principal consideration in striking this balance, the competing
interests of the copyright owner in constraining use of his or her work, and
of the speaker in having broader access thereto, also deserve attention.
Here, I would have courts focus on two issues, which form the second and
278. Claims for expanding the scope of even unauthorized uses of expression when
there is a greater public interest in those uses are supported by the rule giving expanded First
Amendment protection in libel actions which are brought by public officials. In cases
beginning with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Supreme Court
has held that public officials must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
allegedly defamatory statement was false and was made with actual malice. Id. at 279-83.
The same values which make it more difficult to attempt to suppress comments about those
officials support permitting others to make unfettered use of copyrighted expression to
discuss topics in the public arena.
279. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir.
2003) (concluding that photographs of a Barbie doll with social and political overtones were
shielded by the fair use doctrine, and noting that "the benefits to the public in allowing such
use-allowing artistic freedom and expression and criticism of a cultural icon-are great").
280. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that the absence of any special, much less
newsworthy, quality in the materials taken justified the rejection of the defendant's
constitutional defense). The plaintiffs in Krofft had created a children's television show,
replete with characters, locations and themes; the defendant used many of these elements in
a series of commercials. Id. at 1160. After finding infringement, the court concluded:
"Plaintiffs' work in this case is neither a graphic expression nor concerning newsworthy
events. Therefore, no [Flirst [Almendment considerations operate." Id. at 1171 (footnote
omitted).
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third parts of my test. Why was it necessary for the speaker to use the
protected expression? 28' Were there reasonable and meaningful alternatives
for her to convey that expression, and also any ideas embodied therein,
without the unauthorized use of the copyrighted work? Could the parties
reasonably have made arrangements for the copyright owner to authorize
the use of the work?282
The existence of alternatives is evocative of the comparable inquiry
under the Rule of Reason in antitrust analysis. 8 The defendants have
engaged or propose to engage in behavior which arguably adversely affects
competition; they note, in response, that the conduct is in fact intended to
benefit competition. Assume not only that the proffered pro-competitive
effects exist, but that arguably they outweigh the anti-competitive effects,
so that the conduct in question would pass muster under the Rule of
Reason. Courts still may require that the defendants show that those pro-
competitive effects could not have been achieved using a "less restrictive
alternative., 2 84
281. One aspect of this inquiry might be into the nature of the unauthorized speech. An
element of fair use analysis is "the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.. . .." 17 U.s.c.
§ 107(1) (2006). Here, too, I would argue that the claims for a First Amendment privilege to
make that use is stronger if the defendant does not seek to profit from that use; however, as
with fair use analysis, some commercial purpose should not be fatal for a First Amendment
defense. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583-85 (1994)
(finding that the commercial nature of a use does not make that use presumptively unfair, as
commercial use is only one factor to be considered in the fair use analysis).
282. This inquiry parallels, but addresses different concerns than, another of the fair use
considerations: The "effect of the [unauthorized] use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). The copyright side of the analysis
indicates that the unauthorized use is more likely to be deemed fair if the copyright owner
suffers minimal or no economic harm. Id From a First Amendment perspective, under this
proposed approach, the unauthorized use would be least likely to be shielded if the copyright
owner would have been willing to license the use on reasonable terms, but the second party
declined that opportunity. Conversely, the use is more likely to be shielded if considerations
of cost, time or convenience made authorized use difficult, and also where, with respect to
unpublished or out-of-print works, the copyright owner was not seeking any economic
benefit from the work. See infra notes 345-88 and accompanying text (discussing
unpublished and out-of-print copyrighted works).
283. See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) ("[T~he
criteria to be resorted to in any given case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations
of. .. section [1I of the Sherman Act] have been committed is the rule of reason .. .. )
284. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 679 (3d Cir. 1993) ("To
determine if a restraint is reasonably necessary, courts must examine first whether the
restraint fuirthers legitimate objectives, and then whether comparable benefits could have
been achieved through a substantially less restrictive alternative."). However, a
demonstration of the mere existence of some less restrictive alternative to achieve the
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In similar fashion, in the copyright context, courts undertaking this
analysis should properly consider the importance to the speaker, and to the
public, of the use of the plaintiff's protected expression, as opposed to
requiring the speaker to use a paraphrasing or mere description of the
work .28 5 And, since some alternative will always be a possibility, courts
would ask whether that reformulation is sufficiently informative or
effective or convincing.
In a variety of contexts, we recognize that even if paraphrasing or
verbal description may be possible, it often will be far less valuable or
credible. Why, for example, do courts or academics quote the exact
language of prior decisions or secondary authorities, rather than summarize
them?286 The use of the original language conveys authenticity and assures
that the meaning of the words is not distorted. In these situations, as well as
in many others, if the defendant cannot reasonably convey the infonmation
or his or her ideas without using the expressive aspects of the protected
work, courts should conclude that there is a strong, if not compelling, case
for allowing a First Amendment defense. 8
defendants' goal will not satisfy the plaintiff s burden of proof. Since there usually will be
some such alternative, the question becomes whether it is a "reasonable" alternative-if it
also is significantly less satisfactory in meeting those goals, if the costs of using that
alternative are significantly greater, and so forth. See generally Christopher Sprigman,
Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 317 (2009) (drawing on
antitrust jurisprudence, and suggesting different standards for copyright infringement likely
to harm authors' incentives and those with more ambiguous effects).
285. Cf Roy Export Co. Estab. of Vaduz v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 672 F.2d 1095,
1097 (2d Cir. 1982) (considering a challenge, by the owners of the copyrights in several
Charlie Chaplin movies and in a compilation of excerpts of those movies, to a television
network's use of substantial portions of the compilation in the creation of a retrospective
biography which it broadcast shortly after Chaplin's death), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826
(1982). Both the district court and the Second Circuit held out the possibility that in rare
cases, the First Amendment might allow such unauthorized uses even if they were not
shielded by the fair use doctrine. Roy Export Co. Estab. of Vaduz v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
503 F. Supp. 113 7, 1147-48; Roy Export, 672 F.2d at 1099-1100. However, in this case,
constitutional protection was unavailable because the defendant's use of the copyrighted
works was "not essential to CBS's news report of Charlie Chaplin's death or to its
assessment of his place in history." Roy Export, 672 F.2d at 1100 (emphasis added). Here,
the defendant CBS in fact had been offered, and rejected, a license offered by the plaintiffs
to use a different set of Chaplin film excerpts; alternatively, CBS could have used other
Chaplin films which were in the public domain to create its own undoubtedly lawful
compilation. Id. at 1097-99.
286. It is true that most of these situations will be covered by the fair use or other
defenses, and so resort to the First Amendment would not be needed. As discussed above,
however, these internal mechanisms often prove inadequate for a variety of reasons, and so
First Amendment analysis would support immunity for those uses.
287. Cf L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795-96 (9th Cir. 1992) (identifying a
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(3) Consent to Use Is Unavailable
The possibility that the defendant might in fact have authorized the
plaintiff's use would certainly cut against a bald assertion that the First
Amendment permits any unconstrained use.28 However, there will be a
myriad of situations in which the copyright owner will simply not allow
others to reproduce, revise or create a new work based on that work. These
may include situations such as in the Suntrust case,28 where Margaret
Mitchell's estate severely restricted the ability of others to create derivative
works of Gone With the Wind, and doubtless would not have approved of
the creation and distribution of The Wind Done Gone;290 or, as in the Pretty
Woman case,29 where the plaintiffs agent categorically refused permission
case in which the court asked the wrong question in rejecting the defendant's First
Amendment defense). The plaintiff held copyrights in videotapes of newsworthy events-
the sites of an airplane crash and a train wreck. Id at 792. The defendant, which operated a
news clipping service, made and then sold unauthorized copies of portions of those
videotapes. Id. In its consideration of the defense, the court discussed a test proposed by
Professor Melville Nimmer: That a "news photograph in which idea and expression are
inseparable should be subject to a compulsory licensing scheme unless within a month of its
making, the photograph appears in newspapers, magazines or television news programs
servicing a given area." Id. at 796 (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.1 0[c] [2] (1992 ed.)). Here, the test was not met because the
defendant had not shown that these other depictions were unavailable. Id. But, since the
First Amendment protects the interests of individual speakers in being able to convey both
ideas and information in their own voices, as well as the societal utility in a multitude of
such voices, it should not matter that other speakers may have previously spoken.
However, the court may still have reached the correct result. As noted below, the court
should instead have asked whether the defendant had alternate means to make lawful use of
the plaintiff's videotapes. See infra Part II1.C.2.b.(3) (considering circumstances where
consent for use is unavailable). Since the defendant's use was a commercial one, and it was
potentially in competition with the plaintiff, the court should have inquired whether the
defendant would have had a relatively easy opportunity to negotiate for the right to make
and distribute these copies. Infra Part III.C.2.b.(3). The First Amendment is not a blanket
license to take, free of charge, the intellectual property of one's competitors.
288. Here, I assume that the defendant is unable to rely on the fair use doctrine for that
use. That doctrine is designed, of course, to permit certain limited uses, for certain purposes,
without obtaining the permission-and perhaps notwithstanding the objection-of the
copyright owner.
289. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mufflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001)
(reversing the grant of a preliminary injunction prohibiting publication of a parody of Gone
with the Wind).
290. See id. at 1282 (Marcus, J. concurring) (describing Suntrust's "apparent practice of
placing certain editorial restrictions on the authors of its licensed derivatives"'); infra notes
3 32-39 and accompanying text (discussing Suntrust Bank).
291. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994) (finding that
the defendant's commercial parody of the plaintiff's song might be immunized by the fair
888
COP YRIGHT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT89
for creation of an authorized rap version of the plaintiffs song;292 or in
Geis,9 where the publisher refused all offers for permission to reproduce
frames from the Zapruder film. 294 In other cases, while authority might be
forthcoming, the process of obtaining that permission might be
unreasonably laborious, time-consuming or expensive, or the copyright
owner might seek an exorbitant fee for the use of the work. While of
course the First Amendment provides no blanket immunity for
unauthorized use, the case for permitting that use in these situations is
stronger and more compelling.
The policies for permitting these uses, notwithstanding the objections
of the copyright owner, are analogous to the compulsory licenses created by
the 1976 Act.295 Persons other than the copyright owners are permitted to
use certain works, upon the payment of a statutorily or administratively
determined royalty, because there is a strong public interest in expansive
and unconstrained dissemination of those kinds of works, and because the
transaction costs-in terms of money, time delay, and difficulty of
consummating a formal contractual royalty-are significant. Similarly, if
actual permission for use of works is reasonably available, First
Amendment claims should not trump the copyright owner' s interests.
However, in those situations where such permission is not reasonably
available, and where there are strong free speech interests in expanded
distribution, my proposal would effectively result in a judicially created
compulsory license, with a royalty of zero. 296
use defense, and remanding for reconsideration of the four factors in § 107).
292. See id at 592 (noting that the "unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works will
license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions removes such uses from the
very notion of a potential licensing market'); id at 572-73 & 585 n. 18 (concluding that
requesting, and being denied, permission to make authorized use does not weigh against a
finding of fair use).
293. See Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)
(granting summary judgment to the defendants in a fair use case surrounding the publication
of a book about the assassination of President Kennedy).
294. See id. at 137-38 (detailing the plaintiff's refusal to grant permission for the use of
the frames); infra notes 300-10 and accompanying text (discussing Time, Inc.).
295. See 17 U.S.C. § Ill (2006) (authorizing creation of statutory licenses for
secondary transmissions by cable television systems); id § 115 (providing for compulsory
licenses for nondramatic musical works embodied in phonorecords); id. § 118 (providing for
compulsory license for certain works used by noncommercial broadcasters); id. § 116
(providing for negotiated licenses for public performances of nondramatic musical works in
coin-operated players, replacing the provision for compulsory licenses in the original 1976
Act).
296. Presumably, the possibility that courts might find for defendants in such situations
would put pressure on owners of copyright interests in those works to negotiate actual
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(4) Specific Applications of These Principles
There are a variety of situations in which I believe this test would be
met, and in which First Amendment considerations would support the
unauthorized use of copyrighted materials. The first includes certain works
which are so famous or unique that there is no reasonable alternative to
their use. A second category would include certain derivative works, and in
particular parodies or satires. A third category would include certain
unpublished works, and most particularly situations where the copyright
owner is not seeking to exploit or distribute the work, but instead is using
the copyright regime to keep the work from seeing the light of day. A
fourth category-which is a variant on the third-includes certain works
which were once published and are now out-of-print, but are still subject to
copyright protection. 9  Other instances might also be identified. 9
Probably the strongest category for invocation of First Amendment
primacy would be for materials of a famous or unique nature, where the full
meaning or impact of the subject matter cannot be conveyed other than by
use of the particular expressive, and therefore copyright-protected, version
of that subject matter. The Geis case, involving the Zapruder film of
President Kennedy's assassination, has often been offered as a leading
example for recognizing First Amendment primacy.29
Abraham Zapruder, a Dallas dress manufacturer, had stationed himself
along the route of President Kennedy's motorcade, with the intention of
filming home movies with his video camera .300 The scene he photographed
became "an historic document and undoubtedly the most important
photographic evidence concerning the fatal shots. 0 '1 Several years later,
Josiah Thompson, a college history professor, wrote a book about the
agreements, rather than adamantly declining all requests for licensing arrangements.
297. This situation is different from so-called "orphan works," where the identity and/or
location of the copyright owner is unknown, or issues involved in the proposed Google Book
Project, where the copyright owner would theoretically be willing to allow publication for a
fee. Instead, this fourth category includes works where a known copyright owner has
affirmatively decided not to permit further reproduction of an out-of-print work.
298. See infra notes 389-92 and accompanying text (considering materials such as
model statutes and databases of information).
299. Even Professor Nimmer, in his famous article, recognized this situation as a
possible exception to the primacy of the copyright regime in the face of First Amendment
claims. See Nimmer, supra note 10, at 1197-99 (1970) (conceding that public interest
would also dictate similar outcome for unauthorized reproduction and distribution of
photographs of My Lai massacre).
300. Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
301. Id.atl3l.
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assassination, challenging the Warren Comm-ission's conclusion of a single
shooter. 0 In connection with his book, Thompson sought to use some of
the frames from the Zapruder film.303 Rights in the film had been assigned
to Time, Inc.; Thompson and his publisher sought permission to use those
images, but that permission was refused .304 The defendant then used an
artist's sketches of several dozen of the frames from the film; the court
concluded that these were sufficiently identical to Zapruder's work as to
constitute copyright infringement, unless the reproduction was protected by
the fair use doctrine. 0
i this case-which preceded the codification of the fair use doctrine
in the Copyright Act of 1976, but which nonetheless looked to several of
the factors which are contained in § 107-the court recognized a fair use
defense for the defendants' conduct, 0 and therefore found it unnecessary
to consider the defendants' alternative First Amendment defense .30 ' But,
even if the court had reached a contrary result on fair use, I argue that here
free speech concerns would compel a recognition of a right to make these
kinds of unauthorized uses of Zapruder's film. Although the court did not
perform the analysis I have proposed, it made note of all of the factors that I
have suggested a court should consider, to find a First Amendment right to
make an unauthorized use of a work. There was a strong public interest in
permitting this use.30 There was a strong need to use the plaintiffs work,
rather than having the defendant use some (here, nonexistent) alternative, or
simply describe the work .309 Also, negotiations to obtain permission, as an
alternative to unauthorized use, had proven unsuccessful. 1
An example of a situation in which First Amendment interests
properly should have trumped any claims for copyright exclusivity is
presented by a number of the lawsuits asserting infringement of the
302. Id at 131-32.
303. Id at 137-38.
3 04. Id
305. See id1. at 144 ("There is thus an infringement by defendants unless the use of the
copyrighted material in the Book is a 'fair use' outside the limits of copyright protection.").
306. Id at 144-46.
307. Id. at 132.
308. See id. at 146 ("There is a public interest in having the fullest information
available on the murder of President Kennedy.").
309. The court's conclusion on this point was far milder than I would have drawn, but it
did note that "[wihile doubtless the theory could be explained [by some alternatives], the
explanation actually made in the Book with copies is easier to understand." Id
310. See suipra note 294 and accompanying text (explaining that the publisher refused
to give permission to reproduce frames from the Zapruder film).
891
892 7 WA SH. & LEE L. RE V. 831 (2 010)
copyrighted videotape of the beating of Reginald Denny during riots in Los
Angeles, which were an aftermath of the acquittal of police officers in the
prior beating of Rodney King.31'1 Los Angeles News Services (LANS)--an
independent newsgathering organization that had made and then licensed
video recordings of news events-had shot helicopter footage of Denny's
beating. 32In one of those cases, although it had broadcast the videotape on
one of its own affiliates and had licensed it to other stations-for unstated
reasons-LANS had refused to license it to KCAL, the defendant station. 1
KCAL then obtained the tape from another station and broadcast it a
number of times. The district court granted summary judgment for KCAL
on fair use grounds; the Ninth Circuit reversed.
The court of appeals's opinion made only a nodding reference to First
Amendment considerations;31 instead it focused solely on fair use, finding
triable issues on the availability of that defense. Had the court applied the
test I have suggested, its own analysis would have led to the conclusion that
free speech interests prevailed over copyright claims. The court recognized
that the beating of an innocent motorist during those riots was of
overwhelming public interest and concern. 315  It would have ill-served
KCAL's viewers to have a reporter merely describe the situation, rather
than see it with their own eyes.31 Because the videotape was the only
visual record of the incident, the defendant had a compelling need to use it.
311. See, e.g., L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 942 (9th Cir. 2002)
[hereinafter LANS] (providing a case where copyright prevailed over freedom of speech and
press); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 1998)
(same), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999); L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108
F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) [hereinafter KCAL-TV] (same); L.A. News Serv. v. Conus
Commc'ns Co. L.P., 969 F. Supp. 579 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (same).
312. LANS, 305 F.3d at 929.
313. KCAL-TV, 108 F.3d at 1119.
314. In passing, the court noted the defendant's argument that "First Amendment
considerations reinforce the conclusion that KCAL's use was fair," but then it failed to
present any discussion or analysis of that argument. Id. at 112 1.
315. See id. at 1123 ("KCAL's use of LANS's copyrighted tape was arguably in the
public interest because it was a percipient recording of a newsworthy event.").
316. In a later case, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the communicative impact of
visual representation:
In this age of television news, it is frequently the image accompanying the story
that leaves an event seared into the viewership's collective memory. The riots
that shook Los Angeles in April 1992 are bookended by two such images: the
footage of police officers beating motorist Rodney King, which led to the trial
and verdict that sparked the rioting, and the footage of rioters beating truck
driver Reginald Deny....
LANS, 305 F.3d at 929.
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And, the plaintiff s refusal of the defendant's request for a license to use the
tape 37meant that, absent not showing it at all, the defendant had no
reasonable alternative."'
Examples of other situations where the use of photographs or video
recordings of events are essential to discussions of those events, and where
verbal descriptions or altered versions would not be sufficient to permit
comparably robust discussions, might include the photographs of the My
Lai Massacre, 1  the torturing of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison, 2  the
video recordings of the police beating of Rodney King32 orote
newsworthy events.32 In these cases, one element of the public discussion
317. KCAL-TV, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997).
318. The fair use defense was considered in two of the other cases brought by LANS
against other defendants for other instances of copyright infringement; however, neither
opinion even mentioned the First Amendment. See L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television
Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 992-95 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding the fair use defense unavailable in
action involving copying of LANS's videotapes and transmissions to foreign news
agencies), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999); LANS, 305 F.3d 924, 938-42 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the fair use defense could be successfully invoked by one defendant which had
used only a brief snippet of the videotape while operating in a significantly different market
than the plaintiff).
319. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (noting that even Professor Niminer
recognized this example as one in which First Amendment interests should trump).
320. Cf Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1148 (S.D. Cal.
2005) (declining to rule on the defendants' fair use defense in an action for copyright
infringement pertaining to the unauthorized distribution of photographs of Navy SEALs
allegedly torturing Iraqi captives, stating that "that issue is inappropriate for determination in
a [Rule] 12(b)(6) motion").
321. See generally Elizabeth F. Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald, The Rodney King
Videotape: Why the Case Was Not Black and White, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1637 (1993)
(describing the probative value of videotapes of King's beating).
322. See L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 795-99 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the
First Amendment and fair use defenses to the unauthorized copying and distribution of
videotapes of an airplane crash and train wreck); supra note 287 and accompanying text
(providing a detailed discussion of the Tullo case); see also Jackson v. MPI Video, 694 F.
Supp. 483, 489-90 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (granting Jackson's motion for a preliminary injunction
while rejecting the defendant's fair use and First Amendment arguments); Pacific & S. Co.
v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186, 1192-93 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (rejecting the First Amendment
defense for a news "clipping service," which sold copies of plaintiff-station's news
broadcasts saying that the material in question, while "informational,' was "soft news"
lacking significant public interest). In Jackson, the defendant distributed a videotape of the
publicly televised speech delivered by Jesse Jackson at the 1988 Democratic National
Convention (DNC). Jackson, 694 F. Supp. at 485. The district court granted Jackson's
motion for a preliminary injunction, rejecting the defendant's fair use and First Amendment
arguments, based in part on the possibility that Jackson might have wanted to distribute, and
make money from, the tapes of his speech. Id. at 489-9 1. That aside, the court's conclusion
flies in the face of several of its own findings-that the DNC "considers its conventions to
be public events of political and historical significance,' that Jackson himself "testified that
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may be whether certain incidents occurred and, if so, various specific
details of the event. Here, where use of the actual photographs or
videotapes may be necessary to substantiate the speaker's claims, the
second element of my proposed test-a compelling need to use the
protected expression-is likely to be satisfied. 2
The unauthorized creation and distribution of certain parodies,
satires32 or other transformative works would constitute the second set of
situations in which free speech interests on occasion should prevail over
potential objections from the copyright owner. The Dr. Seuss case 325
exemplifies a situation in which, regardless of the fair use analysis,
application of First Amendment values as suggested in this Article would
have called for a different result than the court's analysis, which was
limited solely to the internal mechanisms of the copyright regime.
The defendants created The Cat NOT in the Hat!, which was a
rhyming summary of the O.J. Simpson murder trial, as a parody of the
famous The Cat in the Hat story. The Ninth Circuit rejected the
defendants' fair use defense and upheld the district court's grant of an
injunction against the defendants' publication and distribution of their
work .32 ' The court's dismissive rejection of the defendants' "claim that the
the 'essence' of his speech was 'news' occurring at an 'historical event,"' and that "[hje
desired the speech to receive the widest possible audience." Id. at 487.
323. These situations might also be addressed by another of the internal mechanisms to
the copyright laws: that the expression and the idea have merged. See supra Part III.B.2.b
(discussing the role played by the fair use doctrine in the protection of First Amendment
rights).
324. The Court in Campbell drew a distinction between parodies and satires in
determining the availability of the fair use defense, giving considerably less deference to
satires. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1994) ("Parody
needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its
victim's (or collective victims') imagination, whereas satire can stand on its own two feet
and so requires justification for the very act of borrowing."). Regardless of the merits of that
distinction for evaluating the scope of copyright, I believe that it should be irrelevant for
First Amendment analysis. See also infra note 326 and accompanying text (providing
further discussion of the distinction between parody and satire).
325. See Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1406 (9th
Cir. 1997) (affirming the "preliminary injunction prohibiting the publication and distribution
of the infringing work").
326. In its discussion of the first fair use factor-"the purpose and character of the
[defendants'] use"-the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that "[p]arody is regarded as a form of
social and literary criticism, having a socially significant value as free speech under the First
Amendment." Id. at 1400. However, because it concluded that the defendants' work was a
satire rather than a parody, and that "there is no effort to create a transformative work with
'new expression, meaning, or message,"' the court held that this first factor tipped against
fair use. Id. at 1400-01 (quoting Campbell, 5 10 U.S. at 578).
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injunction in this case constitutes a prior restraint in violation of free speech
guarantee[s]" was tucked away in a footnote and, more importantly, was
limited to a response to the plaintiffs trademark and unfair competition
claims.32
First Amendment values, however, required considerably more respect
for the public interest which would have been advanced by permitting the
distribution of the defendants' work. The O.J. Simpson trial was one of the
closest watched in our nation's history, and the verdict of acquittal was
highly controversial, raising among other issues, matters of racial and
economic equality and justice. 2  While it is true that the defendants'
329
commentary could have drawn on completely original sources, it is likely
that their views would be communicated more effectively by use of Dr.
Seuss's well-known characters and verse patterns. 3 Denying the
defendants the right to create and distribute this satire resulted in the
327. Dr. Seuss, 109 F.3d at 1403 n11. The district court's discussion of the First
Amendment was far more detailed but, as with the court of appeals, its opinion was almost
exclusively directed to its use as a defense to the plaintiff's Lanham Act claims. See Dr.
Seuss Enters., L.P., v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1571-73 (S.D. Cal.
1996) ("Just as in copyright, trademark infringement will be excused only where necessary
to the purpose of the use. Where alternative means of achieving the satiric or parodic ends
exist that would not entail consumer confusion, the First Amendment will not protect the
parodist from being held to infringe.' (footnotes omitted)); see also Browne v. McCain, 612
F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1130-33 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (refusing to dismiss, on the basis of the fair use
defense, a musician-composer' s copyright infringement action against a presidential
candidate for the unauthorized use of his song in a political commercial, finding that the
plaintiff was entitled to further pre-trial discovery). The court considered the First
Amendment defense only in connection with the plaintiff s Lanham Act claim. Id
328. See POSTMORTEM: THE O.J. SIPSON CASE 6, 26 (Jeffrey Abramson ed., 1996)
(noting that "public opinion about Simpson's guilt almost immediately split along racial
lines" and that an "estimated 150 million Americans watched the reading of the jury verdicts,
surpassing all previous television records").
329. The district court suggested another altemative-"freely plunder[ing] the myriad
familiar works already in the public domain." Dr. Seuss, 924 F. Supp. at 1568. But see
supra note 155 (noting a preference for the right to use more recently created works).
330. Cf Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796, 806 (9th Cir.
2003). In Mattel, the defendant had "produce[d] photographs with social and political
overtones. .. , in which he depicted [Mattel's] Barbie in various absurd and often sexualized
positions." Id. at 796 (footnote omitted). Here, distinguishing Dr. Seuss, the Ninth Circuit
found that the photographs were protected by the fair use doctrine. Id. at 806. It rejected
Mattel's argument that the defendant's "work is not parody because he could have made his
statements about consumerism, gender roles, and sexuality without using Barbie." Id. at 802
n.7. The court emphasized that, "[aicceptance of this argument would severely and
unacceptably limit the definition of parody." Id. Although the court's analysis did not
require reliance on constitutional protection, it invoked First Amendment interests to support
its conclusion. Id at 803; see also supra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing the
court's consideration of First Amendment interests).
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elimination of one component of the public discourse on this important
topic.,,
Suntrust is another illustrative case for the supremacy of First
Amendment values. 3 The plaintiff owned the copyright in Gone with the
Wind (GWTW), the well-known novel by Margaret Mitchell. 3 Alice
Randall had written a different novel-entitled The Wind Done Gone
(TWDG)-which used many of the characters, scenes and events from
G WTW. However, instead of the nostalgia for the ante-bellum and post-
Civil War South reflected in GWTW, Randall's novel was in the form of a
diary of a former slave, and was critical of, and cynical about, Mitchell's
331. Admittedly cutting against invocation of a First Amendment right is that the
defendants' use might not have satisfied the third factor in my test. The defendants had not
sought permission to use the copyrighted materials from the plaintiff, although it had
licensed the Dr. Seuss marks to other persons "for use on clothing, in interactive software,
and in a theme park." Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1396 (9th Cir. 1997).
Perhaps an even stronger instance in which the court failed to give appropriate regard to
First Amendment considerations arose in another Ninth Circuit decision. See Walt Disney
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting defendant's fair use
defense concerning the use of Disney characters in comic books "[b]ecause the amount of
defendant's copying exceeded permissible levels"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). In
Air Pirates, the defendants had created adult "counter-culture" comic books, in which
"defendants supposedly sought to convey an allegorical message," and attacked Disney's
"'image of innocent delightfulness,"' by placing "several well-known Disney cartoon
characters in incongruous settings," including engaging in promiscuity or the use of drugs.
Id. at 753. In a decision applying the standards of the 1909 Act rather than the four factors
in § 107 of the 1976 Act, the court of appeals rejected the defendants' proffered fair use
defense. Id. at 758. The defendants' reliance on First Amendment protection was dismissed
in a single paragraph. The court stated that the "defendants' claim can be dismissed without
a lengthy discussion that it otherwise might merit," in light of an earlier decision which had
found "that 'the idea-expression line represents an acceptable definitional balance as
between copyright and free speech interests,"' and "[b]ecause the defendants here could have
expressed their theme without copying Disney's protected expression .... ". Id. at 758-59
(quoting Sid & Marty Kroffi Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1170 (9th Cir. 1977)).
The court was wrong. The defendants' parallel themes-ridiculing the wholesome
world of such Disney characters as Snow White and Mickey Mouse, and offering support for
a dramatically different cultural view-could not have been conveyed without some actual
portrayal of the Disney characters. There was, and still is, significant public value in
debating these competing cultural themes. This was undoubtedly a situation in which the
plaintiff would not have licensed the defendants to make the contested use of their
copyrighted materials.
332. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mufflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (11Ith Cir. 2001).
333. The court noted that "GWTW has become one of the best-selling books in the
world, second in sales only to the Bible," id at 1259, and that it "is one of the most famous,
popular, and enduring American novels ever written," id. at 1271-72.
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oeuvre. 334  The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a
preliminary injunction against publication of TWDG, 3 concluding that the
plaintiff had not met its burden of showing that Randall's work would not
have been shielded by the fair use doctrine. In the course of its opinion, the
court of appeals made several references to the values reflected by the First
Amendment, 3  but found it unnecessary to decide its applicability here.33
I would argue that regardless of the resolution of the statutory defense, this
case is another instance in which First Amendment interests should have
allowed the creation of a parody, notwithstanding the objections of the
owners of copyright in the original work.
Both the topics of slavery and race relations, and the literary and social
dimensions of a work like Gone with the Wind, 18are matters of significant
public interest. Comment and criticism of that work would be made
immeasurably more difficult, and less valuable to the public, if critics were
barred from using Mitchell's language and characters .339  As noted
above,34 there was no possibility for Randall to have obtained permission
for her parody from the copyright owners. Thus, to have denied Randall
the right to this form of commentary would have been to censor not only a
form of expression, but to censor her underlying ideas.
334. See id. at 1270 ("[TWDG] is principally and purposefully a critical statement that
seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology of G WTW. ).
335. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mufflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1386 (N.D. Ga.
2001).
336. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d. at 1263 (asserting that "the First Amendment
was enacted to prevent public censorship" (footnote omitted)); id. at 1264 (noting "the First
Amendment's underlying goal of encouraging open debate and the free exchange of ideas");
id. at 1276 (stressing "that the public interest is always served in promoting First
Amendment values and in preserving the public domain from encroachment").
337. The district court had explicitly rejected the defendant's First Amendment
arguments. See Suntrust Bank, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1384-85 ("With respect to copyright
protection, however, the First Amendment does not license an infringing author to trample
on legally recognized rights."). The court of appeals asserted that in light of the idea-
expression dichotomy and the availability of the fair use defense, there was less need for it to
give consideration to the First Amendment arguments. See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1263.
338. See supra note 333 and accompanying text (noting the enormous popularity of
GWTW).
339. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mufflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1269 (1 lth Cur. 2001)
(noting Randall's contention that "a work of fiction .. . is a more powerful vehicle for her
message than a scholarly article"); id. at 1271 ("It is hard to imagine how Randall could have
specifically criticized GWTW without depending heavily upon copyrighted elements of that
book.").
340. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing the various restrictions
placed on the creation of derivative works by Margaret Mitchell's estate).
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Although closer questions are presented by a more recent parody-
sequel case, 341 there too I would have found that First Amendment interests
trumped the author's copyright claims, irrespective of any fair use analysis.
The defendant had written a work based on J.D. Salinger's famous novel
Catcher in the Rye, using the premise of a character, Mr. C, who was sixty
years older than Holden Caulfield, and then offering the reflections of the
seventy-six year old Mr. C on his life. The district court rejected the
defendant's attempted reliance on the fair use doctrine, making only
passing reference to the First Amendment.1
4 2
It is true that the right conferred on an author by the Copyright Act to
create a derivative work is an important part of the incentive-reward
structure of the statute, and that that right is particularly valuable if the
work achieves, as Catcher in the Rye has, popularity or notoriety.
However, as with Gone with the Wind, there was a strong public interest in
allowing a sequel to this very famous work. That interest was particularly
strong here because of the high probability that Salinger would neither have
created nor have authorized such a work. The use of the format of a sequel
based on this iconic literary character allowed unique insights, which might
not have been achieved as effectively through more traditional forms of
commentary or criticism. Also, the opportunity to read this sequel, and to
compare it to the original, benefitted the public by adding to literary
resources and promoting discourse.
Reemphasis of the economic rationale for copyright-to incentivize
the creation of creative works-is in fact further support for the proposition
that parodies and satires deserve enhanced First Amendment protection.
One factor in the fair use analysis is the effect of the later use on the
economic value of the underlying work.314 3  Because copyright owners
would almost never license others to create a new work which criticizes or
341. See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (rejecting the
defendant's fair use defense and noting the lack of legitimate parodic content), vacated on
other grounds, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).
342. Although the court weighed all four factors of 17 U.S.C. § 107, in particular it
found under § 107(l) that the defendant's work was "non-transformative," because it was
insufficiently "parodic" either of Catcher in the Rye or of Salinger. See id. at 261-63
(describing the limited extent of any arguably transformative elements within the
defendant's work 60 Days). Here, contrasting the analysis in Suntrust, the court found "no
reasonably discernable rejoinder or specific criticism of any character or theme of Catcher."
Id. at 258 (footnote omitted).
343. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (setting forth the fourth factor in the fair use test as
"the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"); see
also supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text (providing further analysis of the fourth
consideration in the fair use test).
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pokes fuin at their works, the only harm to their works is the loss of
reputation, and potential sales, because the public's estimation of them has
diminished. It is clear that there is no copyright infringement based on
criticism which does not use the protected expression. Similarly, I would
assert that First Amendment values should trump whatever limited
copyright interests exist in being free of that loss of reputation if the
effectiveness of that criticism depends on actual use of the expressive
components of the works.3 "4
The final two instances in which the First Amendment certainly should
call for broader access than afforded by the internal mechanisms both
involve circumstances when the copyright owner wants no distribution of
his or her work. One of these situations is works which the copyright
owner simply does not want reproduced or distributed, by himself or
anyone else, such as unpublished works, but where there is a strong public
interest in access to those materials. The other would involve works which
at one time were published and distributed, but which are now out-of-print
and where the copyright owner has no desire to publish additional copies.
With regards to unpublished works, for the overwhelmingly majority
of copyrighted materials, the interest of the public and of the copyright
owner will coincide, as she exercises her right to exploit the work and seeks
to maximize its commercial return. As a result, the work will be available
to the public, albeit under the copyright owner's control and subject to
restrictions and payments. When she uses copyright to protect her privacy
interests by simply prohibiting access to and use of the work by others, 4
however, the public interest in broad access and dissemination is negated.
The approach I suggest is consistent not only with First Amendment
values, but also with those of the copyright regime. It can hardly "promote
the Progress of Science" to have creative works kept totally under wraps.34
344. Indeed, critical commentary is still protectable. even if it is harmfuil to the
commercial value of the work or to the author's reputation. See, e.g., Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc. v. Gen. Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1983) ("A court would not find
it relevant in deciding the fair use question, however, that evidence might show that the
devastating critique had diminished sales by convincing the public that the original work
was of poor quality.").
345. As noted above, protection of privacy interests should be the exclusive province of
state law, and is not a legitimate goal of the federal copyright regime. See supra notes 34-
42 and accompanying text (discussing the function of common law copyright with respect to
the protection of privacy interests).
346. Indeed, it might be argued-perhaps in another article-that the Copyright Clause
cannot authorize protection of works which will be kept secret, and thus which cannot meet
that preambular objective. But see Chicago Bd. of Ed. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 627
(7th Cir. 2003) ("It may seem paradoxical to allow copyright to be obtained in secret
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I certainly do not assert that the First Amendment permits copying or
distribution of every private letter, diary, or the like. However, in the
limited category of situations in which the copyright owner forbids the
dissemination of materials about which there is a strong public interest, we
should applaud, or at least condone, its dissemination by others. 4
A prime example of a situation in which the First Amendment should
have prevailed was J.D. Salinger' s successful copyright infringement
challenge to an unauthorized biography. 4 Ian Hamilton, described by the
court of appeals as "a well-respected writer on literary topics, 3 49 initially
sought Salinger's cooperation for access to and permission to quote from
Salinger's unpublished writings in preparing the biography.35 0 After that
was denied, Hamilton turned in part to private letters written by Salinger
and donated by their recipients to several university libraries. In the
biography, Hamilton quoted from some portions of those letters and
paraphrased others. The district court had denied Salinger's request for a
preliminary injunction against the publication of the biography,35 ' but the
Second Circuit reversed. 5 In an opinion that made absolutely no mention
of First Amendment concerns, the court of appeals concluded that Hamilton
documents, but it is not.... [Fjederal copyright is now available for unpublished works that
the author intends never to see the light of day." (citations omitted)).
347. The argument that the First Amendment should on occasion override federally
afforded copyright interests with respect to unpublished materials has only had vitality since
1978. Under the regime prevailing under the Copyright Act of 1909 and earlier statutes, so-
called state "common law copyright" protected unpublished works, and federal protection
arose only after publication. See Bauer, supra note 40, at 6-7 (delineating the various
copyright protections under state and federal law prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act
of 1976). Thus, pre-1976 analysis would have focused solely on a clash with published
works. See supra notes 39-40 & 262 and accompanying text (discussing the preemption
provision of the Copyright Act of 1976).
348. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir.) (concluding that
Salinger was entitled to a preliminary injunction against the publication of an unauthorized
biography), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
349. Id. at 92.
350. Id. at 92-93. Salinger is best known for the novel Catcher in the Rye, published in
1951. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text (describing the popularity of
Salinger's Catcher in the Rye). As of the time that Hamilton completed the biography,
Salinger had not published any literary work in nearly thirty years, and he lived a life as a
recluse in rural New Hampshire. See Salinger, 811 F.2d. at 92 ("[Salinger] has not
published since 1965 and has chosen to shun all publicity and inquiry concerning his private
life.").
351. Salinger v. Random House. Inc.. 650 F. Supp. 413, 428 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
352. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100.
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was not entitled to rely on the fair use doctrine for his attempted use of
Salinger's letters. 5
The court's judgment is problematic on two counts. First, its
balancing of the four fair use factors354 put far too much weight on the fact
that the letters were unpublished. 5 Second, the court gave far too little
weight to the social and literary value in the public's having access to
Salinger's words and thoughts, and the imperative facing an author who
wanted to convey Salinger' s expression, rather than a cold narrative of the
facts contained in those letters. These unaddressed concerns are the
elements which I have suggested above should be a part of a First
Amendment balancing. 5 Because Salinger is someone whose works have
reached iconic status in twentieth-century American literature, 5
information about him, as would be uniquely reflected in his other writings,
353. See id ('[Flair use ... is not available with respect to the current version of
Hamilton's proposed biography.").
354. 17 U.S.C. § 107(l)-(4) (2006).
355. The court initially noted that "[cientral to this appeal is the application of the
defense of 'fair use' to unpublished works." Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90,
95 (2d Cir. 1987). Asserting that "we place special emphasis on the unpublished nature of
Salinger's letters," id. at 96, the court read the Supreme Court's decision in Harper & Row
for the proposition that unpublished works "normally enjoy complete protection against
copying any protected expression." Id. at 97; see also supra notes 1 34-53 and
accompanying text (providing further discussion and criticism of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Harper & Row). The Second Circuit concluded that while the § 107(1) factor
tipped towards the defendants, the other three factors-and particularly § 107(2), because
the plaintiff s work was unpublished-all tipped towards the plaintiff. Id. at 97-99. But see
infra note 372 (discussing the legislative overrule of Salinger).
356. The district court had recognized the importance of using Salinger's expression.
See Salinger, 650 F. Supp. at 424 ("To the extent [a biographer] departs from the words of
the letters, he distorts, sacrificing both accuracy and vividness of description.").
The court of appeals was unpersuaded. See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 96 ("[Tlhe biographer
has no inherent right to copy the 'accuracy' or the 'vividness' of the letter writer's
expression. Indeed, 'vividness of description' is precisely an attribute of the author's
expression that he is entitled to protect.").
The biographer's difficulty and the public's loss were compounded by the fact that the
court also found infringement arising from some of the paraphrased text, concluding that it
was sufficiently similar to Salinger's original language. See id at 98 ("[11n all of the
instances where that minimum threshold [of creativity] is met, the Hamilton paraphrasing
tracks the original so closely as to constitute infringement."). Thus, even this attempt to
avoid use of Salinger's expression proved unavailing. The resulting uncertainty about how
far one must go to avoid infringement is yet another example of the chilling effect on would-
be later users.
357. See New Era Publ'ns. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1989)
(describing Salinger as a "literary lion").
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is of significant public interest and value.35 Because Salinger refused to
allow public access to those works, there was no reasonable alternative
available, other than Hamilton's relatively modest quotations and
paraphrasing of the letters, to convey their substance to the public.
Two years later, the Second Circuit again shortchanged the First
Amendment interest in permitting unauthorized copying of works of
significant public concern, in another case involving a critical biography of
another figure of great notoriety and importance, this one examining the life
and writings of L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of the Church of
Scientology.359 Russell Miller, the author of the biography, incorporated in
his work frequent quotations both from Hubbard's unpublished writings
60
and from his published books, pamphlets and bulletins issued to Church
members. The district court316 ' concluded that the majority of Miller's
quotations were either noninfringing or were covered by the fair use
doctrine.36 Importantly, in reaching the latter conclusion, the court
emphasized that Miller needed to use Hubbard's words, because summaries
or paraphrasing would be inadequate to convey Hubbard's character and
behavior. 6
However, because a number of Miller's uses of Hubbard's words were
infringing,3 the district court held that Miller and Holt, the publisher of the
358. The court asserted that denying "a biographer like Hamilton the opportunity to
copy the expressive content of unpublished letters is not .. , to interfere in any significant
way with the process of enhancing public knowledge of history or contemporary events."
Salinger, 811 F.2d at 100. The court believed that the public interest was adequately
satisfied by Hamilton's ability to report facts, and it seemed undisturbed by the fact that
"[p~ublic awareness of the expressive content of the letters will have to await either
Salinger's decision to publish them"-which evidence suggested would never occur--or
"until the expiration of his copyright," seventy years after his death in 2010. Id. I suspect
that many of the millions of fans of Salinger's works, whether casual readers or serious
scholars, will not be comforted by the thought that they will enter the public domain in 2080.
359. New Era, 873 F.2d at 576-77.
360. See id. at 578-79 (noting that Miller borrowed mostly excerpts from Hubbard's
diaries in addition to quoting from his letters and other unpublished documents).
361. New Era Publ'ns. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1528 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (concluding that the "interests of free speech overwhelmingly exceed the plaintiff's
interest in an injunction").
362. See New Era, 873 F.2d at 587 n.2 (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (detailing the findings
of the district court: Only three of the sixty-nine uses of published materials were infringing
and uncovered by the fair use doctrine while forty-one of 132 uses of unpublished materials
were unlawful).
363. See New Era, 695 F. Supp. at 1524 ("Hubbard's expression is taken primarily to
show character flaws in a manner that cannot be accomplished without use of his words.").
364. See New Era Publ'ns. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 587 n.2 (2d Cir.
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biography, which was the sole named defendant, had engaged in copyright
infringement. After expressly considering First Amendment interests,
however, the district court concluded that the strong public interest in
access to Hubbard's words, so as to enable readers of the biography to
make a more accurate assessment of competing claims about his life and his
beliefs, 6 militated against granting an injunction forbidding its
publication, 6 and instead the court limited the plaintiff to monetary
relief.36
7
1989) (Oakes, C.J., concurring) (noting that the district court found a total of forty-four
infringing uses, mostly derived from unpublished materials, with a total of thirty-seven
infringing uses from Hubbard's diaries).
365. In approving a more expansive application of the fair use doctrine, the district
court properly noted that allowing a public figure like Hubbard to use the copyright laws to
prevent dissemination of negative information would cause serious harm to free speech
interests. It said:
[Tbo make this right [of first publication] inevitably prevail over all competing
considerations would lead to absurd results that are almost incompatible with
First Amendment interests. By registering a copyright, public figures who are
the expected focus of public interest could use this supposed commercial
protection as an aggressive weapon to prevent the publication of embarrassing
revelations and to obstruct criticism.
New Era, 65 5F. Supp. at 1502.
366. Unlike the typical infringement action, where the defendant's conduct affects the
plaintiff s ability to exploit his work and arguably reduces the incentive to create new works,
here the plaintiffs principal concern was to deprive the public of access to critical and
unflattering information about Hubbard which could be conveyed only by use of Hubbard's
expressions. The court stated:
Hubbard's writing is quoted to substantiate the argument of a laboriously
researched, well-constructed biography representing, right or wrong in its views,
a valuable commentary on a subject of public importance.. .. Surely the
suppression of such a work implicates concerns of the First Amendment. ...
If. .. the copyright owner can be reasonably compensated in damages for injury
to this commercial interest, and the injury to the public interest in free speech
resulting from injunction would be great, that is a powerful reason for limiting
the remedy to damages and withholding the injunctive relief.
Id. at 1525-26.
367. Id. at 1527-28. This decision suggests another, albeit partial, means of
accommodating First Amendment interests: a strong presumption against issuance of an
injunction, and limiting the copyright owner to an action for damages. Although the
Copyright Act expressly authorizes the grant of an injunction, 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006), such
relief, particularly when granted even before the allegedly offending work has been
distributed, runs afoul of a core First Amendment doctrine: forbidding injunctions which
constitute a prior restraint against certain speech. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S.
539, 559 (1976) ("[Plrior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the
least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.").
This judicial option of only granting monetary relief also addresses some of the
concerns raised by my third factor for deciding whether free speech interests should trump
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The Second Circuit affirmed on other grounds, finding that the claim
was barred by laches. 6 However, it also included extensive and
unnecessary dictum,369 rejecting the district court's fair use and First
Amendment analysis. 3 70 As to the former, the court relied in large part on
the close-to-irrebuttable presumption, stated in Salinger,37 of an absence of
copyright claims-whether the second user has a reasonable alternative to the unauthorized
use of the work-and it has some of the earmarks of creating a compulsory license for use of
certain works. There is ample authority for withholding injunctive relief in appropriate
situations. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(concluding that the traditional four-factor test for granting injunctive relief applies to patent
infringement actions and that the trial court's decision to grant or deny injunctive relief is an
act of equitable discretion, reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion); Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994) (suggesting that "[blecause the fair use
enquiry [sic] often requires close questions of judgment as to the extent of permissible
borrowing," the "goals of copyright law ... are not always best served by automatically
granting injunctive relief' (citations omitted)); Salinger v. Coltmng, 607 F.3d 68, 82 (2d Cir.
2010) (finding that the eBay standard for grant of injunctive relief also applied to copyright
claims, and applied equally to preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and noting that
"[e]very injunction issued before a final adjudication on the merits risks enjoining speech
protected by the First Amendment"); New Era Publ'ns. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d
576, 595-97 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, C.J., concurrng) (citing cases supporting the denial of
an injunction when public and First Amendment interests are at stake). But see Pac. & S.
Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499-1500 (11Ith Cir. 1984) (concluding that the district
court abused its discretion by withholding injunctive relief because of First Amendment
considerations, and that a modest furtherance of First Amendment interests from increased
public access to a copyrighted work is relevant only to liability issues, not to forms of relief),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985). However, given the potential for substantial damages
for copyright infringement, this alternative still raises significant chilling effect concerns,
and therefore for materials which would meet my proposed test for First Amendment
preference, it is only the second best solution.
368. New Era Publ'ns. Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989).
369. It was particularly problematic for the court of appeals to address constitutional
issues, when it resolved the case on unrelated equitable considerations. See supra note 224
and accompanying text (discussing the practice of avoiding unnecessary constitutional
issues); ef Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If there is
one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication,
it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality..,. unless such [questions
are] unavoidable."); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (explaining that constitutional questions should not be decided unless
"'absolutely necessary to a decision of the case"' (quoting Burton v. United States, 196 U.S.
283, 295 (1905))).
370. In additional dictum, the court of appeals also disagreed with the district court's
decision to deny injunctive relief, asserting that '[tlhe public would not necessarily be
deprived of an 'interesting and valuable historical study,' but only of an infringing one."
New Era, 873 F.2d at 584 (citations omitted).
371. See supra note 355 and accompanying text (discussing the high level of protection
for unpublished works).
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fair use for unpublished works; 37 1 the court also disagreed with the district
court's weighing of the other three fair use factors. Without belaboring the
point, this portion of the court of appeals's opinion again demonstrates the
frequent inadequacy of fair use as an internal mechanism to protect First
Amendment interests. 7
The court of appeals's First Amendment analysis, while limited, took
two familiar tracts. One was the suggestion that there was no room for First
Amendment considerations in the face of claims of copyright
infringement174 - position rejected by the Supreme Court a few years later
372. See New Era, 873 F.2d at 583 ("Where use is made of materials of an 'unpublished
nature,' the second fair use factor has yet to be applied in favor of an infringer, and we do
not do so here.").
Two years later, the Second Circuit adhered to that position in Wright v. Warner Books,
Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 737 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Our precedents, then, leave little room for
discussion of this factor [§ 107(2)] once it has been determined that the copyrighted work is
unpublished."). Nonetheless, there the court found fair use. See id. at 740 ("Three of the
four fair use factors clearly favor the defendants. The one that does not-the nature of the
copyrighted work-raises an obstacle to this conclusion, but not an insurmountable one.").
The suggestion that unpublished works should almost never receive "fair use" treatment
was abrogated legislatively in 1992. See Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992)
(providing that "[tihe fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use
if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.") (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 107). The legislative history expressly criticized the holdings of Salinger and New Era;
while it approved of Wright's nonabsolutist result, it also noted that "concern has been
expressed that the Wright decision did not disavow certain troublesome language in the
Salinger opinion." H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 5-9 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2553, 2556-61.
373. Interestingly, in a case decided the following year, New Era Publications
International v. Carol Publishing Group, which involved another unauthorized and
unflattering biography of Hubbard, but where this author had only used excerpts from
Hubbard's published works, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's conclusion that
these quotations were outside the scope of the fair use doctrine. See New Era Publ'ns Int'l
v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 161 (2d Cir.) ("We hold that each of the four factors of
§ 107 favors appellant, and that the book's use of quotations from Hubbard's published
works was protected fair use."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990).
374. See New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2nd Cir. 1989)
("We are not persuaded, however, that any first amendment concerns not accommodated by
the Copyright Act are implicated in this action.").
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in Eldred.7 The other was the suggestion that the fair use and idea-
expression doctrines adequately protected First Amendment interests. 7
In my view, this case and Salinger should be seen as easy cases in
which First Amendment interests should trump objections to the
unauthorized use of the plaintiffs' protected expression. 3 77 All three of the
considerations identified above were present. The subject matter of the
speech, and the very expressions used, were matters of significant public
interest. 7 The defendants' communications would have been, and in
375. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) ("We recognize that the D.C.
Circuit spoke too broadly when it declared copyrights 'categorically immune from
challenges under the First Amendment.' (quoting Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C.
Cir. 2001))); see also supra notes 9 & 237 and accompanying text (discussing other
instances where the courts have expressed the view that First Amendment considerations are
inapplicable to copyrights).
376. See New Era, 873 F.2d at 584 ("Our observation that the fair use doctrine
encompasses all claims of First Amendment in the copyright field never has been
repudiated .... An author's expression of an idea, as distinguished from the idea itself, is
not considered subject to the public's 'right to know."' (citations omitted) (quoting WILLIAM
F. PATRY, THE FAiR USE PRIVILEGE iN CopynioGn7 LAw 466 (1985))).
In another Scientology case, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communication Services, 923 F. Supp. 1231 (N.D. Cal. 1995), the defendant, Erlich, had
posted both published and unpublished Church works on an internet newsgroup which was
dedicated to criticisms of the Church. Id. at 1239. Erlich had quoted from most of these
works-and sometimes in their entirety-without making any edits or changes; rather, they
were accompanied by the defendant's minor comments. Id. at 1243. The court's detailed
examination of the four fair use factors, id. at 1242-50, justified its rejection of the fair use
defense. However, as is true with most other decisions treating the issue, its rejection of
First Amendment concerns was lamentably limited. See id. at 1258 ("Because Erlich is able
to continue to criticize the Church and use its published and unpublished works to the extent
allowed by the doctrine of fair use . . . , Erlich's First Amendment interests have been
adequately considered.").
377. See Online Policy v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2004),
for another example of an easy case where First Amendment principles should trump. The
defendant was the manufacturer of electronic voting machines, which were the subject of
substantial critical commentary as to their verification procedures and reliability. Id. at
1197. A number of Diebold employees exchanged internal emails, acknowledging problems
associated with the machines. Id The plaintiffs obtained access to these machines and
posted them on the Internet. Id. By invoking provisions of the DMCA and by threatening
copyright infringement actions, the defendants were successful in having those emails
removed from the Internet. Id. at 1198. In an action challenging that behavior, the court
found that the plaintiffs' conduct was shielded by the fair use doctrine, noting that the
plaintiff's purpose was to "inform[] the public about the problems associated with Diebold's
electronic voting machines," and saying "[ult is hard to imagine a subject the discussion of
which could be more in the public interest." Id at 1203 (emphasis added).
378. C( Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001) (noting that "enforcement of
[the statutory] provision .. , implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment because it
imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information of public concern. In these
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Salinger in fact were, far less effective when the use of the plaintiffs' actual
words was foreclosed .37 9  The defendants also had no reasonable
alternative, such as seeking advance permission, to the unauthorized uses.38
Similar First Amendment concerns are implicated in the second
situation-previously published works, where the copyright owner no
longer wishes public distribution of the work. Interestingly, several of
these disputes have arisen over religious publications. For example, in the
Worldwide Church of God case,38 the predecessor of the plaintiff, a
religious organization, had distributed more than one million copies of a
book written by Herbert Armstrong, the church's founder. 8 After
Armstrong's death, the plaintiff determined that the book was racist and
inconsistent with modern social norms, and it decided that it would no
longer distribute any more copies of the book; it also destroyed most of the
copies in its inventory.383 A splinter church organization-which continued
to adhere to Armstrong's tenets-made and distributed virtually identical
copies of the book.38
The Third Circuit upheld the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim,
rejecting both the fair use and First Amendment defenses. 8 The latter
cases, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of
public importance").
379. See, e.g., New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493, 1523-24
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("These are uses for which the biographer's point cannot be effectively
demonstrated without the subject's words--demonstrations of traits of character.").
380. In an earlier case, Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303 (2d Cir. 1966), the Second Circuit indicated that these first two considerations, public
interest in the matter and the necessity of using the original work, were relevant in
determining whether a particular unauthorized use fell within the fair use doctrine. See id. at
307 ("Whether the privilege may justifiably be applied to particular materials turns initially
on the nature of the materials, e.g., whether their distribution would serve the public interest
in the free dissemination of information and whether their preparation requires some use of
prior materials dealing with the same subject matter."), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967);
see also New Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 589 (2d Ci[. 1989)
(Oakes, C.J., concurring) (placing similar emphasis on the factors of public interest and the
necessity of using the original work, saying, "the second use must serve the public interest
and must require use of the original work").
381. See Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110, 1120 (9th
Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant's fair use defense for its unauthorized reproduction and
distribution of a copyrighted work finding that the religious nature of the work did not




385. Id. at 1120.
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analysis386 is noteworthy, both for its brevity and its failure to consider the
range of concerns I have already identified. Quoting from Harper & Row,
the court asserted that "[t]he public interest in the free flow of information
is assured by the law's refusal to recognize a valid copyright in facts."
387
But, that bald assertion fails again to capture the importance to the
defendant, and its adherents, of distributing Armstrong's very words .3 88 A
recitation of the facts, or a recasting of Armstrong's ideas, was clearly
insufficient to fully and accurately convey his views. Because the plaintiff
absolutely refused to allow the distribution of the book, the defendant had
no reasonable alternative to taking the steps it did. Thus, the First
Amendment should have permitted the defendant to make those copies.
Finally, there may be other situations that do not fall into these four
categories but which would also satisfy my proposed test for permitting the
unauthorized reproduction or distribution of copyrighted materials. One
such situation would be the reproduction of model statutes or ordinances,
drafted by a private entity or organization, and subsequently enacted into
law by a governmental body. 389 Although surely such model statutes would
initially be entitled to copyright protection, I would freely allow third
parties not only to copy and distribute the ordinance as enacted, but also to
take the short-cut route of reproducing the underlying model law. In the
only case to have decided the legality of that behavior, Veeck v. Southern
386. Calling this portion of the court's opinion an analysis is generous. Instead, it was
a melange of citations and quotations from other opinions. Id. at 1115-16.
387. Id. at 1115 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
558 (1985)).
388. Without making the case even more complicated, there was arguably a different
First Amendment concern involved here-under the Free Exercise Clause. See id at 1120-
21 (considering and rejecting defendant's defense under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act). It goes without saying that constraints on adherents of any religious denomination or
sect which limit their ability to engage in religious practices-whether they arise under the
copyright laws or otherwise-raise additional public concerns and interests. Cf Penguin
Books U.S.A., Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor, Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 4126, 2000
WL 1028634, at * 17...19 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2000) (rejecting the defendant's fair use defense
in an action challenging the copying of religious texts and concluding that enforcement of
copyright would not violate the defendants' right under the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause); Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 895 F. Supp. 1329, 1332-34 (D. Ariz. 1995)
(rejecting the First Amendment argument, premised on religious nature of infiringed works,
that the Establishment and Freedom of Speech Clauses foreclose copyright protection);
Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 634-35 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (rejecting the First
Amendment argument, premised on the religious nature of the infiringing and infringed
works, that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses foreclose copyright protection).
389. Another situation would include proposals to give protection to databases and
other collections of facts. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (presenting First
Amendment objections to such legislation).
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Building Code Congress International,9 the Fifth Circuit relied on two of
the traditional internal mechanisms to support a conclusion of
noninfringement, finding that the enacted versions of the model laws
became unprotectable facts, and that the expression contained in their
words had merged with the idea embodied in the ordinances.3 9' Although I
agree with that result, alternatively I would have found that the First
Amendment interests in being able to reproduce and distribute the
ordinance itself would have trumped any claim under the copyright laws.39
Because unfettered access to the text of the law is often crucial to its
understanding and implementation, the alternative of requiring others
instead to paraphrase or describe it will not be suitable.
c. Instruction from Other Intellectual Property Regimes
While First Amendment defenses arising in the context of state law
intellectual property claims-and in particular with the alleged
infringement of the right of publicity-are beyond the scope of this Article,
some of the learning from those cases is instructive. As with copyright,
there is no absolute First Amendment right to use a person's name, image
or attributes without his or her permission. In the only Supreme Court case
to have considered this issue 393 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting
390. Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 293 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding
that Veeck did not violate copyright law when he copied the law of Anna and Savoy, Texas
even though those laws incorporated copyrighted model building codes). In Veeck, the
defendant maintained a noncommercial website with information about north Texas. Id at
793. Two small towns in north Texas had adopted ordinances, using the text of a Standard
Building Code written by the plaintiff. Id. The defendant purchased a disk containing a
copy of the Code from the plaintiff;, although that disk had a copyright notice, indicating that
the Code could not be copied and distributed, the defendant posted the text of the Code on
his website. Id.
391. Id. at 801-02. Having disposed of the case on these grounds, the court found it
unnecessary to consider the fair use defense. Id at 802 n. 17.
392. These First Amendment considerations are particularly important because Veeck
was an en banc decision and was resolved by a vote of 9-6. Id at 793. Although the issue
was not addressed by the majority, one of the two dissents asserted, incorrectly in my view,
that "SBCCI simply is not stifling access to, or speech about, THE law. SBCCI has not
violated the First Amendment vis-d-vis Veeck." Id. at 821 (Wiener, J., dissenting). Even the
majority carved out only limited rights to use those proposed laws, asserting that "the result
in this case would have been different if Veeck had published not the building codes of Anna
and Savoy, Texas, but the SBCCI model codes, as model codes." Id. at 805 (majority
opinion).
393. The Court has discussed the clash between other kinds of state law claims and the
First Amendment on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388
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Co. ,39 the Court concluded that the First Amendment did not foreclose a
right of publicity claim for a television station's unauthorized videotaping
and broadcasting of the plaintiff's performance as a "human cannonball ."3 95
Justice White's opinion for the Court identified the competing interests
of the state in allowing the right of publicity claim and the constitutional
interest in permitting unrestricted access to the plaintiffs performance.
Those state interests are very familiar to students of copyright law39 6 -
encouraging the investment of time and money by performers to stimulate
the development of these acts for the benefit of society and providing
rewards to performers for those undertakings. These goals are achieved by
allowing performers to control access to their performances. 9 By
comparison, the First Amendment is designed to encourage broader
dissemination to the public of both newsworthy and entertaining material.
Here, the Court concluded that this constitutional prerogative was exceeded
by the unauthorized dissemination of plaintiff's "entire act." 9
(1967) (finding that the First Amendment limits the application of a state statute allowing
damage awards for false reports concerning matters of public interest unless it is proved that
"the defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of
the truth"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 283 (1964) (concluding that a
public official cannot recover damages for defamation or libel absent proof that the
statement was made with actual knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its
truth or falsity). Other than their general learning about the scope of the First Amendment,
these cases are also beyond the scope of this Article.
394. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977).
395. See id ("The Constitution does not prevent Ohio from making a similar choice
here in deciding to protect the entertainer's incentive in order to encourage the production of
this type of work."). The defendant videotaped the entirety of defendant's act-which took
place at a county fair and which lasted fifteen seconds-without his permission, and then
broadcast the act as one part of an evening news report. Id. at 563-64.
396. On three separate occasions, the Court's opinion compared the state's interests in
protecting the plaintiff's persona and performance to the federal interests in affording
copyright protection. See id. at 573 ("[T]he State's interest is closely analogous to the goals
of patent and copyright law. .. ."); id. at 575 ("The Constitution no more prevents a State
from requiring respondent to compensate petitioner for broadcasting his act on television
than it would privilege respondent to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic work
without liability to the copyright owner .. .. ". (citations omitted)); id. at 576 ("This same
consideration [to provide economic incentive to produce a performance] underlies the patent
and copyright laws ..... )
397. See id. at 578 ("[NMeither the public nor [defendant] will be deprived of the benefit
of petitioner's performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is appropriately
recognized. Petitioner does not seek to enjoin the broadcast of his performance; he simply
wants to be paid for it."). Thus, the majority's focus was on the financial consequences of
the unauthorized broadcast.
398. See id. at 575 ("[W]e are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do
not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's entire act without his consent.").
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This conclusion is problematic, as demonstrated by Justice Powell's
dissenting opinion.39  In addition to the imprecision of the standard,4  the
Court gave too little attention to the adverse effects of its judgment. The
broadcast of the plaintiffs performance during a standard local newscast
was typical of the reporting that the First Amendment was designed to
protect and encourage. 0 Conversely, the Court's holding that this
particular broadcast was unprotected is likely to have a chilling effect on
other kinds of reporting, by causing risk-averse media firms to engage in
self-censorship-all to the detriment of the viewing and listening public.
Thus, as in the copyright cases discussed above, here Zacchini's regrettable
diminished concern for First Amendment values reflects the extent to which
the attempted balancing of the clash between the two regimes can give
inadequate protection for free speech concerns. 0
399. See id. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's emphasis on the
respondent's use of the performer's entire act). Zacchini was a 5 to 4 decision. Justices
Brennan and Marshall joined in Justice Powell's dissent. Id. Justice Stevens dissented
separately, arguing that it was not clear that the case could not have been decided on
independent state law grounds. Id. at 582-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
400. See id. at 579 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("I doubt that this formula [of performer's
entire act] provides a standard clear enough even for resolution of this case." (footnote
omitted)).
401. See id. at 580-81 (asserting that the First Amendment's purpose of encouraging
reporting of "newsworthy events" would be undermined by the majority's 'entire act'
standard). The performance by the "human cannonball" at the Geauga County Fair was
likely of significant interest to people in the television station's viewing area. Id at 580.
Because a picture is worth a thousand words, a mere verbal description of the performance,
absent some footage of the event, would have inadequately informed the viewing public.
402. As noted, Zacehini involved a clash between a state-created right of publicity and
the First Amendment. However, in a footnote, the Court "note[d] that Federal District
Courts have rejected First Amendment challenges to the federal copyright law on the ground
that 'no restraint [has been] placed on the use of an idea or concept."' Id. at 577 n.13
(majority opinion) (citations omitted).
This particular observation has been relied on and cited by subsequent courts to support
the assertion that the idea-expression dichotomy justifies a more limited scope for a First
Amendment defense regarding the copyright regime as well as state law claims. See, e.g.,
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 582 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the originality requirement for obtaining copyright "also ensures
consonance with our most important First Amendment values"); Int'l Olympic Comm. v.
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 781 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Such property rights [in
trademarks] can be protected without violating the First Amendment."); Walt Disney Prods.
v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge,
because defendants allegedly could have expressed their theme without copying plaintiff's
expression), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books
USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1575 (S.D. Cal. 1996) ("Copyright law accommodates the
concerns of the First Amendment through its exclusion of protection for ideas, and through
the fair use doctrine."), affid, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1146 (1997).
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A number of other courts have reached conclusions similar to
Zacchini.403 In particular, when the use of the plaintiff's name, image or
persona are undertaken for commercial purposes, courts invoke the well-
known principle that First Amendment protection for commercial speech is
more limited .4
By contrast, however, when the challenged use is for noncommercial,
entertainment purposes, and particularly when the use has newsworthy
In Jackson v. MPfI Home Video, 694 F. Supp. 483 (N.D. 111. 1988), the court cited
Zacchini to support the grant of an injunction against the distribution of a videotape of a
speech given at the 1988 Democratic National Convention, because the plaintiff, Reverend
Jesse Jackson. "can show he earns part of his living by being paid for his oratory." Id. at
489. Even if there might be some justification for restricting First Amendment rights for
broadcasts of the entire act of an entertainer such as the "human cannonball," there is far less
justification for extending that financial concern to the First Amendment rights of persons
reproducing a speech delivered at a political convention.
403. Perhaps the leading example of a failure to recognize, much less accommodate,
First Amendment interests is White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. See White v.
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that the
defendant's use of Vanna White's persona was not protected speech because it was used for
the purpose of making profit). In White, the Ninth Circuit upheld a claim based on an
advertisement for consumer electronics which included a robot standing next to the Wheel of
Fortune set; the court held that this evocation of Vanna White's persona infringed on her
right of publicity. Id. at 1399. The court's discussion of First Amendment concerns was
limited. It stated:
[Elven if some forms of expressive activity, such as parody, do rely on identity
evocation, the [F]irst [Almendment hurdle will bar most right of publicity
actions against those activities .... In the case of commercial advertising,
however, the [Flirst [Almendment hurdle is not so high. .... Unless the [Flirst
[A]mendment bars all right of publicity actions-and it does not, see Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed. 2d
965 (1977)--then it does not bar this case.
Id. at 1401 n.3. Far more persuasive was Judge Kozinski, who, in his dissent firom the
court's denial of a rehearing en banc, asserted that "not allowing any means of reminding
people of someone [constituted] a speech restriction unparalleled in First Amendment law."
Id. at 1519 (Kozinski, J, dissenting) (footnote omitted).
See also Bosley v. WildWetT.comn, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 926-31 (N.D. Ohio 2004)
(rejecting the argument that the defendant's unauthorized sale of a videotape of the plaintiff-
news reporter's "wet t-shirt" performance was shielded by First Amendment because the
images distributed by the defendant did not contain transformative or creative elements, and
its use of those images was solely for commercial exploitation of her fame).
404. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 562-63 (1980) ("[Olur decisions have recognized 'the commonsense distinction
between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally
subject to government regulation, and other varieties of speech.' The Constitution therefore
accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed
expression." (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ohtralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978))).
912
COP YRIGHT AND THE FIRST AM1ENDMENT91
qualities,405 the importance of protecting First Amendment values becomes
more pronounced. Here, just as with the balancing of copyright interests
discussed above, and in contrast to the majority view in Zacchini, the public
interest in allowing such unauthorized use should trump the interests in
protecting the plaintiff s state-created, state-protected intellectual property.
A recent case illustrates this preferred balancing. In C.R.C.
Distribution & Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P.,40 C.B.C., the producer of fantasy baseball games, used the names of
and information about major league players, without their permission, to
create those games .40 ' Although the Eighth Circuit concluded that the
players properly stated all the elements of a right of publicity claim, it held
that C.B.C. 's First Amendment privilege superseded the players' state law
rights. 0 The court first identified both the economic and noneconomic
interests advanced by a right of publicity.409 These state interests are
evocative of the interests underlying the copyright regime; they included
"the right of an individual to reap the rewards of his or her endeavors" and
the state's "desire to provide incentives to encourage a person's productive
activities. 41 0 Although the court downplayed the importance of these goals
in the case of already highly paid baseball players, its more critical
observation was that "state law rights of publicity must be balanced against
[F]irst [A]mendment considerations, and here we conclude that the former
must give way to the latter." 41 1 Not only was the information that CBC
used already in the public domain; there was a recognized public value in
that information, and indeed the public was benefitted by the use that
C.B.C. made of it.412 Thus, the First Amendment properly prevailed, to
displace the plaintiff's state law claim.
405. Although commercial uses properly receive less First Amendment protection,
courts should not distinguish among different forms of noncommercial uses. Supra notes
403-04 and accompanying text.
406. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2872 (2008).
407. Id. at 820.
408. See id at 824 ("[W]e hold that CBC's [Flirst [A]mendment rights in offering its
fantasy baseball products supersede the players' rights of publicity.").
409. Id
4 10. Id.
411. Id. at 823 (citations omritted).
412. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003) is another
decision which properly strikes the balance between the public interests and the private right
of publicity. In ETW Corp., the co-defendant Rush, a sports artist, had created a print,
including an action portrait, of Tiger Woods's memorable victory at the 1997 Masters
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IV Conclusion
Virtually no one would contend that the First Amendment's command
that "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press," operates as a total ban on legislation which cabins the rights of
speakers or writers. 1 The parallel constitutional provision in Article 1,
however, authorizing the conferral under the copyright laws of exclusive
protection for an author's writings, runs a serious risk of excessive
interference with the First Amendment's scope of protection. There are
numerous cases in which courts have failed to accord appropriate scope to
free speech interests. The more significant problem arises from the chilling
effect that those decisions have had on would-be users of copyrighted
materials: the speech that has not occurred because of fear of an
infringement action.
This Article argues for a new balance, which tips more firmly towards
accommodating free speech concerns, while in time also affording
somewhat more precision and thereby reducing the uncertainty of whether
an unauthorized use of protectable expression will obtain constitutional
protection. First Amendment interests should prevail over copyright claims
when there is a compelling public interest in allowing that unauthorized
use; when the speaker has a compelling need to use the expression itself,
such as when paraphrasing, or describing, or summarizing the work is
simply inadequate to meet the speaker's needs; and when there are no
reasonable alternatives available to obtain actual consent to that use.
Tournament. Id. at 918. Multiple copies of these prints were produced and distributed by
co-defendant Jireh. Id. The court rejected Woods's action for infringement of his right of
publicity, concluding that the First Amendment trumped the state law claim:
Permitting Woods's right of publicity to trump Rush's right of freedom of
expression would extinguish Rush's right to profit from his creative enterprise.
After balancing the societal and personal interests embodied in the First
Amendment against Woods's property rights, we conclude that the effect of
limiting Woods's right of publicity in this case is negligible and significantly
outweighed by society's interest in freedom of artistic expression.
Id at 938; see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959,
976 (10Oth Cir. 1996) (rejecting baseball players' right of publicity claims against the creators
of parody trading cards, stating that the "cards ... are an important form of entertainment
and social commentary that deserve First Amendment protection").
413. U.S. CONSr. amend. I (emphasis added).
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